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SUMMARY
Kerberos is a widely-deployed network authentication protocol that is being consid-
ered for standardization. Like other standard protocols, Kerberos is no exception to security
flaws and weaknesses, as has been demonstrated in several prior works. Provable security
guarantees go a long way in restoring users’ faith, thus making a protocol an even stronger
candidate for standards. In this thesis, our goal was thus to provide provable security sup-
port for Kerberos and other practical protocols. Our contributions are three-fold:
1. We first look at the symmetric encryption schemes employed in the current version
5 of Kerberos. Several recent results have analyzed a significant part of Kerberos v.5
using formal-methods-based approaches, which are meaningful only if the underly-
ing encryption schemes satisfy strong cryptographic notions of privacy and authen-
ticity. However, to our knowledge these schemes were never analyzed and proven
to satisfy such notions. This thesis aims to bridge this gap. Our provable security
analyses confirm that some of the encryption scheme options in Kerberos v.5 already
provide privacy and authenticity, and for the remaining we suggest slight modifica-
tions for the same.
2. We next turn our attention to the ways in which the keys and other random strings
needed in cryptographic schemes employed by practical protocols are generated.
Randomness needs to be carefully generated for the provable security guarantees
to hold. We propose an efficient pseudorandom generator (PRG) based on hash func-
tions. The security of our PRG relies on exponential collision-resistance and regular-
ity of the underlying hash function. Our PRG can be used to generate various strings,
like session keys, sequence numbers, confounders, etc., which are all suggested to
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be generated randomly in the Kerberos v.5 specification, but no algorithms are men-
tioned. Each of the above strings are required to satisfy different properties, all of
which are trivially satisfied by the pseudorandom strings output by a PRG.
3. Finally, we look at the problem of revocation associated with two relatively new types
of encryption schemes: identity-based encryption (IBE) and attribute-based encryp-
tion (ABE). While these encryption schemes are relatively less efficient compared to
public-key encryption schemes, they have already been used (and are very likely to
be used in future, as well) in many practical protocols due to their attractive features.
Any setting, public-key, identity-based, or attribute-based, must provide a means to
revoke users from the system. However, unlike public-key encryption, there has been
little prior work on studying the revocation mechanisms in an IBE or ABE. We pro-
pose new primitives and their efficient and provably secure instantiations, focusing
on the revocation problem.
We would like to note that even though all the results presented in this thesis are moti-
vated mainly by provable security in practice, only the first bullet above has a direct impact
on a practical and widely deployed protocol Kerberos. Our PRG is the most efficient con-
struction among theoretical PRGs, but it may still not be efficient enough to be directly
usable in practical protocols. And our results and techniques for revocation in IBE and
ABE have found much wider applications in information security, such as mobile social





Kerberos is a trusted third party network authentication protocol that allows a client to
authenticate herself to multiple services, e.g., file servers and printers, with a single login.
Kerberos has become widely deployed since its origination as MIT’s project Athena in
1988. It has been adopted by many large universities and corporations, is part of all major
computing platforms, e.g., Windows (starting from Windows 2000), Linux, UNIX, and
Mac OS X, and is a draft standard at IETF [92].
Provable security was introduced in the pioneering work of Goldwasser and Micali
[50], and it provides us with a sound, mathematical framework for either designing new
schemes/protocols, or analyzing existing ones for security guarantees. In the provable se-
curity approach, the very first step is to define a security model for a given security goal,
such as achieving privacy via encryption. A security definition specifies precisely what an
adversary is allowed to do and what it means to break the scheme. The next step is the
design and/or analysis of a scheme. This may include, depending on the scheme, either a
proof (by reduction) that the scheme is secure, or an attack showing some insecurity, both
following the security model defined. A proof by reduction shows that if an adversary can
break the scheme, then one can actually break the security of the building blocks, which
are assumed to be secure. The final step is to justify the assmptions, if necessary.
Many popular and widely deployed protocols (or, the cryptographic schemes employed
in them) have been analyzed by cryptographers using the provable security approach, for
example, Secure Shell (SSH) [15], Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) [23], and Internet
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Protocol Security (IPsec) [79, 38, 39], to name a few. These analyses normally reveal im-
portant security weaknesses and design flaws in the protocols, and are most of the time ac-
companied with provably secure ways to fix them. However, to the best of our knowledge,
no such provable security analysis was performed on Kerberos, which made us wonder if
Kerberos was really fit to be a standard network authentication protocol. Several attacks
[22, 89, 9, 8, 86, 93] on the previous versions of the protocol indicated otherwise.
The main motivation of this thesis was thus to provide provable security support for
Kerberos and other practical protocols. Our contributions are three-fold, and we present
them in the following three sections.
1.1 Symmetric Encryption in Kerberos
1.1.1 Motivation
Analyzing a complex protocol like Kerberos is not an easy task. The analysis can be greatly
simplified by taking a modular approach: first dividing the protocol into several smaller
components, then analyzing each of the components in isolation, and finally analyzing how
each of these components interact with each other. This is, however, easier said than done.
Formal methods (a.k.a., symbolic approach), which treats cryptographic operations as for-
mal expressions, can be very helpful toward this goal. In formal methods, cryptographic
primitives are modeled to have idealized security properties (e.g., a ciphertext reveals ab-
solutely no information about either the key, or the message), and then the whole protocol
is analyzed via formal expressions to see if it satisfies the required properties.
Several prior works have analyzed Kerberos using the symbolic approach. Butler et al.
[35, 36] have analyzed significant portions of the current version of Kerberos and its exten-
sions in the symbolic approach (i.e., Dolev-Yao model [41]), and have formally verified that
the design of Kerberos’ current version meets the desired goals for the most part. However,
a known limitation of such analyses is a high level of abstraction. A significant advance
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was made by a recent work by Backes et al. [4], in that it is the only work providing sym-
bolic analysis that also guarantees security in the computational setting, the well-accepted
strongest model of security. Their results use the computational soundness model due to
Backes et al. [6, 7, 5]. However, for their results to hold, cryptographic primitives used
in the protocol need to satisfy strong notions of security (in the computational setting).
Namely, as the result of [73, 1] implies, the symmetric encryption schemes utilized by the
protocol need to provide privacy against chosen-ciphertext attacks (be IND-CCA secure),
as well as authenticity and integrity of ciphertexts (be INT-CTXT secure).
However, it was not known whether authenticated encryption schemes1 in Kerberos
are IND-CCA and INT-CTXT secure. Certain known vulnerabilities [93] indicated that
encryption schemes in version 4 did not satisfy these notions. While the schemes in the
current version, v.5, were designed to resist known attacks, it was not clear whether they
provably resist all attacks of the class, and if they do, under what assumptions. Our work
aims to close this gap.
1.1.2 Related work
Bellare and Namprempre [16] studied various ways to securely compose secure (indistin-
guishable under chosen-plaintext attacks, or “IND-CPA”) encryption and secure (unforge-
able against chosen-message attacks, or “UF-CMA”) message authentication code (MAC)
schemes. They showed that only one out of the three most straightforward composition
methods, Encrypt-then-MAC, is secure in general, i.e. always yields an IND-CCA and
INT-CTXT encryption scheme. At the same time, certain secure components can yield
a scheme, constructed via Encrypt-and-MAC or MAC-then-Encrypt paradigms, that is not
IND-CCA or not INT-CTXT. If Kerberos’ design had utilized the Encrypt-then-MAC com-
position method with secure encryption and MAC schemes, we would have nothing to
1We will often refer to encryption schemes whose goal is to provide both privacy and authenticity as
authenticated encryption.
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prove here. However, Kerberos uses some variations of Encrypt-and-MAC and MAC-then-
Encrypt methods that also employ some encodings on the message, i.e. preprocessing of
the message before encryption and MAC are applied.
Bellare et al. [15] analyzed the security of encryption in another widely deployed proto-
col, Secure Shell (a.k.a. SSH). They suggested several modifications to the SSH encryption
to fix certain flaws, and they proved that the resulting scheme is IND-CCA and INT-CTXT
secure. They also provided general results about security of stateful encryption schemes
composed according to the Encode-then-Encrypt-and-MAC paradigm, assuming certain
security properties of the base encoding, encryption, and MAC schemes. The encryption
scheme proposed for the revision of Kerberos v.5 (cf. Simplified Profile in [82]) conforms
to the Encode-then-Encrypt-and-MAC method. However, the security results from [15]
do not directly imply strong security for Simplified Profile in Kerberos. First, the general
results from [15] do not guarantee a strong notion of integrity of ciphertexts; they only
consider a weaker notion of integrity of plaintexts. Second, the result of [15] requires an
IND-CPA secure base encryption scheme, but the base encryption in Kerberos is CBC with
fixed IV, which is not IND-CPA secure.
Krawczyk [66] showed that the MAC-then-Encrypt composition method yields a secure
authenticated encryption scheme, if the underlying MAC is UF-CMA, and if the encryption
scheme uses a PRF blockcipher in CBC with random IV mode. We cannot use this result to
prove security of our suggested encryption scheme that we call “Modified General Profile”,
because the latter uses the CBC mode with zero IV, and moreover, it uses a particular
encoding scheme so that the confounder (that basically plays the role of random IV for
CBC) is also being MACed and encrypted. Proving this scheme requires special care.




We take a close look at the encryption schemes used in Kerberos v.5 (according to its
specifications [81, 82]), in order to prove them secure, in the IND-CCA and INT-CTXT
sense, assuming the underlying building blocks (e.g., a blockcipher) are secure. Our results
complement the formal methods-based analysis of Kerberos as a key establishment and
authentication protocol [35, 36].
General Profile. We first look at the encryption scheme description in the current version,
v.5, specification (cf. [82], Section 6). We will refer to it as “General Profile”. Fix a
blockcipher with input-output length n, and a key for it; a checksum, i.e., a hash function
with arbitrary input length, and output length l. A message M is first padded to make
the length of the message plus l, a multiple of n. Next, a random n-bit string con f is
chosen. Then the checksum is applied to the string con f ‖0l‖M. Let us call the checksum’s
output σ. Finally, the blockcipher in the CBC mode with fixed initial vector IV = 0n
is applied to the string con f ‖σ‖M. Decryption is defined accordingly. Security of the
scheme depends on how the checksum function is instantiated. The suggested instantiation
is a hash function. We observe that General Profile conforms to a general Encode-then-
Checksum-then-Encrypt construction, and the latter has a weakness. Namely, we show
that even if one assumes the “more secure” component options, e.g., a secure blockcipher
in a secure encryption mode and a secure hash function, the Encode-then-Checksum-then-
Encrypt construction is not secure in general. That is, there exist attacks on the scheme
composed of certain secure components, which shows that it does not provide integrity of
ciphertexts. We note that these attacks do not apply to General Profile itself, as it uses
a particular encryption scheme recommended in [82]. Nevertheless, the attacks show a
weakness in the overall design.
Modified General Profile. We propose simple and easy to implement modifications that
are sufficient for proving the security of the design of General Profile. Namely, we show
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that if the scheme uses a secure blockcipher (a pseudorandom function, or “PRF”) in the
CBC mode, as specified by General Profile, and if a message authentication code (MAC)
that is also a PRF is used as a checksum in place of the hash function, then Modified
General Profile yields an encryption scheme that is IND-CCA and INT-CTXT secure. In
particular, AES that is assumed to be a PRF and HMAC that is proven to be a PRF assuming
the underlying compression hash function is a PRF [11, 10], are good candidates for a
blockcipher and MAC, respectively.
Simplified Profile. Next, we look at the recently proposed revisions to the encryption
design in Kerberos, known as Simplified Profile (cf. Section 5 in [82] and [81]). This
encryption scheme, for which implementations have not caught up yet, recommends to use
AES or Triple-DES as a blockcipher, and HMAC [11] as a MAC, in the following manner.
The message is first encoded such that the necessary padding is appended, and a random
confounder (the name was suggested in most Kerberos specifications) is prepended. The
blockcipher in CBC mode or a variant of CBC mode with ciphertext-stealing2, both with
fixed all-zero-bit IV, and HMAC are applied to the encoded message independently to yield
two parts of the resulting ciphertext. Decryption is defined accordingly. We prove that this
method yields an encryption scheme that is IND-CCA and INT-CTXT secure, under the
assumption that both the blockcipher and the MAC are PRF. This confirms soundness of
the design of Simplified Profile. AES is conjectured to be a PRF, Triple DES was shown
to be a PRF in the ideal cipher model [21], and as mentioned before, HMAC was proven
to be a PRF, assuming the underlying compression hash function is a PRF [10]. Therefore,
they are the right choices of instantiations for Simplified Profile. We note that even though
Simplified Profile uses the CBC scheme with a fixed IV, this does not compromise the
security because pre-pending a random confounder to the message before encrypting makes
the scheme equivalent to the CBC with random IV.
2Even though we analyze Simplified Profile only with “plain” CBC mode of encryption, we note that our
analysis can easily be extended to CBC mode with ciphertext-stealing, and the results remain unaffected.
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While our results are not as unexpected or “catchy” as some results discovering a flaw
or implementing an attack on a practical protocol, they are far from being less important.
Having provable security guarantees is an invaluable benefit for any cryptographic design,
especially a widely deployed protocol. Our results together with the formal methods-based
results in the symbolic setting constitute strong provable security support for the design of
Kerberos.
This is a joint work with Alexandra Boldyreva. An extended abstract version of this
work appeared at the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy [27], and a full
version appeared in the Journal of IET Information Security [28].
1.2 Randomness Generation in Practical Protocols
1.2.1 Motivation
The Kerberos v.5 specification [92] suggests that various strings, e.g., session keys, se-
quence numbers, confounders, etc., be generated randomly3. While it does not specific any
algorithm for generating those strings, it does mention certain requirements, such as (1) it
should be impossible to guess the next session key based on the knowledge of past session
keys, (2) a sequence number should not collide with other sequence numbers currently in
use, and so on.
Rather than trying to satisfy the different specific requirements of any protocol, there
is a unified approach which trivially satisfies all such requirements: use a pseudorandom
generator (PRG) to generate the desired amount of pseudorandom bits (which can’t be
distinguished from perfectly random bits by any polynomial-time machine) from a small
amount of perfectly random bits, called as the seed of the PRG, and then use the pseudo-
random bits as session keys, sequence numbers, or any such strings that are suggested to
be generated randomly.
3The term “random” is used loosely here, and doesn’t necessarily mean perfectly random, where all the
outcomes are equally likely.
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Protocol analyses done using symbolic approach assume perfect randomness. How-
ever, if we only care about real-world (i.e., computationally bounded) adversaries, then
pseudorandomness is just as good, because as pointed out above, for a polynomial-time
machine pseudorandom strings are equivalent to perfectly random strings.
PRG is an important cryptographic primitive that was introduced by Blum and Micali
[24], and later formalized into its current form by Yao [91]. PRGs can also be used as
building blocks for more complex cryptographic objects like pseudorandom function (PRF)
[47], bit commitment [75], etc.
In their seminal work, Håstad et al. [59] building on the previous works [61, 58] show
how to construct a PRG, henceforth called HILL-PRG, from any one-way function. While
the construction is of great theoretical value, it is extremely (orders of magnitude) ineffi-
cient compared to Blum-Micali-Yao (BMY) PRG that builds on a one-way permutation.
BMY-PRG is the most efficient known construction, whose security relies on a reasonable
assumption.
Practical, standardized PRGs [3, 42, 40] can be classified mainly into two categories,
depending on the cryptographic primitives they are based on, namely, block-ciphers and
hash functions4. These PRGs are not our focus for the following reasons:
• The security proofs of block-cipher-based PRGs rely on idealised models of compu-
tation, like ideal cipher model.
• The security proofs of hash-function-based PRGs assume that the underlying hash
function is a pseudorandom function family (PRF). A PRF is a collection of efficiently-
computable functions, such that a function chosen at random from this collection
can’t be distinguished by any polynomial-time machine from a random oracle (i.e.,
a function whose outputs are fixed completely at random). We believe that this as-
sumption on a hash function is quite unreasonable, as hash functions not only do not
4By a hash function, we mean a function whose range is smaller than the domain, also referred to as a
compression function.
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have secret keys, but are usually keyless.
We investigate a question of finding an efficient hash-function-based PRG, whose secu-
rity relies on collision-resistance, a very well-studied and widely-used property of a hash
function. A collision-resistant hash function (CRHF) is of course one-way but certainly
not a permutation, as it compresses the input, and hence BMY-PRG is not suitable for our
problem.
1.2.2 Related Work
As we will explain soon, the seed length (as a function of the input length m of the under-
lying function) is an important measure of the efficiency and the security of a PRG. The
best known bound for HILL-PRG of O(m8) was shown by Holenstein [60]. This was later
improved (for an alternative construction) to O(m7) and O(m4) by Haitner et al. in [55] and
[56], respectively. While we certainly don’t want longer seeds for obvious reasons, they
also have a great impact on the security reduction of the PRG, in that it gives a lower bound
on the security, i.e., for the same level of security, HILL-PRG would require a seed that
is of size at least an eighth power of the seed size required by BMY-PRG. We present an
example to truly appreciate the effect of seed length on the security of a PRG. Say, we have
a one-way function that is secure, according to current standards, only for inputs of size at
least 128 bits, then Holenstein’s proof shows that HILL-PRG is secure only for seeds of
size (ignoring constants) at least 256 bits! Several works have tried to bridge this huge gap
from BMY-PRG’s seed length of O(m), by making stronger assumptions on the underlying
function. Following are the two main types of strengthening in the assumption:
• Regularity. Goldreich et al. [48] gave a construction of PRG with seed lengthO(m3),
whose security requires that the underlying function is one-way and regular. This
was later improved by Haitner et al. [55], where they first present a tighter security
proof for a construction similar to that of Goldreich et al., thus improving the seed
length to O(m2) (cf. Section 3.3 in [55]). In the following section of the same work,
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Haitner et al. show how the seed length can be further reduced to O(m log m) by the
use of bounded-space generators of Nisan [77] (or, Impagliazzo et al. [62]).
• Exponential hardness. Holenstein [60] gave a construction of PRG with seed length
O(m5), whose security relies on the underlying function being an exponentially hard
one-way function. This was later improved by Haitner et al. to seed length O(m2) in
[54] and [56], where the latter (unlike prior works) doesn’t require adaptive calls to
the one-way function.
1.2.3 Our Contributions
We construct a new hash-function-based PRG with seed length less than 2m, i.e., as efficient
as BMY-PRG, thus improving the efficiency over all prior works which do not rely on
permutations (i.e., function-based PRGs) and have reasonable assumptions. Our scheme is
reminiscent of the classical constructions [24, 91] iterating a function on a random seed and
extracting Goldreich-Levin hardcore bits [49] at each iteration step. One notable difference
from BMY-PRG is that instead of a permutation, we use a hash function. Let h be a hash
function mapping strings of size m bits to strings of size n bits, for m > n. Assume we have
a random seed (x, r), where both x and r are n bits long, and we want to generate l (> 2n)
pseudorandom bits. The first bit of the output is the inner product of x and r, denoted as
〈x, r〉. To generate the second bit, compute the first hash-iterate h1(x) ← h(x‖0m−n), and
output 〈h1(x), r〉. For the third bit, compute the second hash-iterate h2(x)← h(h1(x)‖0m−n),
and output 〈h2(x), r〉. Repeat this process until (l − n) bits are output, and also output r.
The latest PRG of this type that relies on reasonable assumptions (regularity and one-
wayness) is due to Haitner et al. [55]. In addition to a regular one-way function, each
iteration in their scheme uses a new pairwise-independent function (which is basically the
only main difference from our construction), whose descriptions are part of the seed. Our
construction presented above does not use pairwise-independent functions and is thus more
efficient, requiring less computation and a significantly shorter seed. Our scheme’s security
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relies on the standard notions of collision-resistance and regularity of the underlying hash
function, where the collision-resistance is required to be exponential (such a function is also
referred in the literature as an “exponentially hard CRHF”). In particular, any polynomial-
time adversary should have less than 2−n/2 probability of finding collisions, where n is the
output size of the hash function. This should not be confused with the famous birthday
bound, which roughly says that with 2n/2 number of random trials, one can find collisions
(with noticeable probability) in any hash function of output size n. Here, we are talking
about the probability of collision and not the number of trials.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to combine the above two strength-
enings (i.e., regularity and exponential hardness) for improving the efficiency of a function-
based PRG. Exponential collision-resistance is not a new assumption, but only requires a
more strict upper bound on the probability of finding collisions, and unlike the pseudoran-
domness of hash functions (which not only do not use secret keys, but are usually keyless),
it is still a very well accepted assumption in the community. Also, given the search for a
new hash standard SHA-3 by NIST [78], it is plausible that some (if not all) of the candidate
submissions to the competition provide exponential collision-resistance. We later show
how to relax the regularity assumption by introducing a new notion that we call worst-case
regularity. The notion of worst-case regularity lower bounds the size of the smallest set
of preimages of different elements in the range, while the common regularity assumption
requires all such sets to be of equal size. It was shown by Bellare and Kohno [14] that
collision-resistance degrades exponentially (in the range of the function) when a function
deviates from regularity, so a CRHF must be very “close” to regular, and experiments on
practical hashes like SHA-1 support this claim (cf. Section 11 in [14]). So, the worst-case
regularity assumption on a practical CRHF seems to be reasonable as well. We note that a
notion similar to ours, called “weakly regular” was introduced in [48]. This notion doesn’t
seem to be useful for our proof, because at a high level it captures the average of the sizes
of different preimage sets of a function, whereas what we need is a lower bound on these
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sizes.
Levin [67] observed that the BMY-type constructions are secure for functions that are
one-way even when applied on their own outputs, a property called one-way on iterates
(OWI), which one-way permutations trivially satisfy. However, it would be a stretch to
assume that practical hashes have this property. We also note that collision-resistance alone
may not be sufficient to prove that a function has the OWI property. Consider a CRHF h
that acts as a permutation after one application, i.e., for any x in the domain of h, h(h(x))
is a permutation on h(x) (some padding can be used to make h(x) of input-size, we omit
this padding here for simplicity). For such a CRHF, a security reduction from OWI to
collision-resistance is not possible. The reason is that the output of an adversary that can




cannot be used to find collisions in h, because
the set h−1(h(h(x))) has just one element due to h being a permutation after one application.
Someone familiar with the proofs of BMY and related PRGs may also be skeptical about
the other direction, i.e., proving the security of our scheme assuming only the regularity and
collision-resistance of h, without employing the “re-randomizing” pairwise-independent
functions. The reason is that the security requires h to remain one-way on every iteration,
but while h is believed to be collision-resistant and thus one-way (i.e., it is hard to invert
h(x) for a random point x in the domain), it is not necessarily hard to invert h(h(x)), because
h(x) (for a random x) is not necessarily a random point in the domain. In other words, the
sets of points to which h is applied may shrink with each iteration, diminishing the one-
wayness property of h, and thus violating the security of the PRG. Somewhat surprisingly,
we show that these sets in our construction do not shrink significantly, if it is exponentially
hard to find collisions in h. Unlike previous results on the security of PRGs, our theorem
provides a concrete security statement, so that it is possible to see exactly how the security
of our PRG degrades with the degradation in the collision-resistance of the underlying hash
function, and thus allows a more accurate comparison with other schemes.
Our construction is very efficient (though still not comparable to practical, standardized
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PRGs [42]) and simple, as at each iteration it uses a hash function and an inner-product
computation, both of which are relatively fast. In Section 4.5, we show how using a classi-
cal method of [48, 46] the efficiency of our scheme can be further improved by extracting
up to a constant fraction of n hardcore bits at each iteration, as the underlying CRHF is as-
sumed to be exponentially hard. We recall that our scheme is similar to the basic construc-
tion (that doesn’t use bounded-space generators and has a seed length of O(m2)) of [55],
but we do not use pairwise-independent functions, which permits significant efficiency im-
provements, allowing our scheme to have a very short seed. To put the comparison in
perspective, the basic scheme of [55] implemented with the compression function of SHA-
256 (as the regular one-way function) would require around half a million random bits (as
seed) to generate one extra pseudorandom bit, while our construction would just require
512 bits. Our security reduction is very tight, comparable to that of [55], even though the
latter does not provide all the details for the concrete security of their PRG. While our
construction is mainly of theoretical interest, we believe our approach and treatment has
moved theoretically sound PRGs much further towards practical use. The novel worst-case
regularity definition may be of independent interest.
This is a joint work with Alexandra Boldyreva. An extended abstract version of this
work appeared at the 2012 Cryptographers’ Track of the RSA Conference (CT-RSA) [29],
and a full version is available from IACR’s Cryptology ePrint Archive [30].
1.3 Revocation in Newer Types of Encryption
1.3.1 Motivation
Identity (ID)-based encryption, or IBE for short, and its recent cousin attribute-based en-
cryption (ABE) are exciting alternatives to public-key encryption, which eliminate the need
for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that makes publicly available the mapping between
identities, public keys, and validity of the latter. The senders using an IBE (or, ABE) do
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not need to look up the public keys and the corresponding certificates of the receivers, be-
cause the identities, e.g., emails or IP addresses (or, in case of an ABE, a set of attributes)
together with common public parameters are sufficient for encryption. The private keys of
the users are issued by a trusted third party called the private key generator (PKG). Ideas of
identity-based cryptography go back to 1984 and Shamir [84], but the first IBE scheme was
constructed by Boneh and Franklin only in 2001 [34], building on the progress in elliptic
curves with bilinear pairings. The first ABE scheme under the name “Fuzzy IBE” came
soon after in 2005 [83].
Any setting, public-key, identity-based, or attribute-based, must provide a means to
revoke users from the system, e.g., if their private keys get compromised. In a PKI setting,
a certification authority informs the senders about expired or revoked keys of the users via
publicly available digital certificates and certificate revocation lists.
As a solution to this problem for IBE, Boneh and Franklin [34] suggested that users
renew their private keys periodically, e.g., every week, and senders use the receivers’ iden-
tities concatenated with the current time period, e.g., “week 17 of 2012”. Notice that since
only the PKG’s public key and the receiver’s identity are needed to encrypt, and there is no
way to communicate to the senders that an identity has been revoked, such a mechanism to
regularly update users’ private keys seems to be the only viable solution to the revocation
problem. This means that all users, regardless of whether their keys have been exposed or
not, have to regularly get in contact with the PKG, prove their identity and get new private
keys. The PKG must be online for all such transactions, and a secure channel must be
established between the PKG and each user to transmit the private key. Taking scalability
of IBE deployment into account, we observe that for a very large number of users this may
become a bottleneck.
We note that alternatively, in order to avoid the need for interaction and a secure chan-
nel, the PKG may encrypt the new keys of non-revoked users under their identities and the
previous time period, and send the ciphertexts to these users (or, post them online). With
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this approach, for every non-revoked user in the system, the PKG is required to perform
one key generation and one encryption operation per key update. We note that this solution,
just as the original suggestion, requires the PKG to do work linear in the number of users,
and does not scale well, as the number of users grows. Our goal was thus to study this
problem and find solutions to alleviate it.
While IBEs and ABEs are relatively less efficient compared to public-key encryption
schemes, they have already been used (and are very likely to be used in future, as well) in
many practical protocols due to their attractive features. Also, the techniques and solutions
presented in this thesis have found applications in securing personal health records in cloud
computing [68], encryption-based access control in social networks [63], securing content-
centric network [94], user revocation scheme in mobile social networks [69], and public
key management for vehicular ad hoc networks [85], to name a few.
1.3.2 Related work
Efficient revocation is a well-studied problem in the traditional PKI setting, e.g., [71, 76, 2,
74, 72, 45, 51]. However in the setting of IBE, there has been little work on studying the
revocation mechanisms. Hanaoka et al. [57] propose a way for the users to periodically
renew their private keys without interacting with the PKG. The PKG publicly posts the key
update information, which is much more convenient. However, each user needs to posses a
tamper-resistant hardware device. This assumption makes the solution rather cumbersome.
Revocation has been studied in the ID-based setting with mediators [33, 70]. In this
setting, there is a special semi-trusted third party called a mediator who holds shares of all
users’ private keys, and helps users to decrypt each ciphertext. If an identity is revoked, the
mediator is instructed to stop helping the user. However, we want to focus on a much more
practical, standard IBE setting where users are able to decrypt on their own.
The main goal of a broadcast encryption is to prevent revoked users from accessing
secret information being broadcast. The broadcast encryption solutions, however, and in
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particular ID-based broadcast encryption ones, do not directly translate into solutions for
our problem. In a broadcast encryption, a non-revoked user can help a revoked user gain
access to the encrypted message being broadcast (as the message is the same for all parties).
On the other hand, in the IBE setting a revoked user, or the adversary holding its private
key, should not be able to decrypt encrypted messages even if it colludes with any number
of non-revoked users.
Thus, to the best of our knowledge, the solution proposed by Boneh and Franklin in
[34] was the most practical user revocation solution in the IBE setting.
1.3.3 Our Contributions
We propose a new way to mitigate the limitation of IBE with regard to revocation, and
improve efficiency over the prior solution. We want to remove interaction form the process
of key update, as keeping the PKG online can be a bottleneck, especially if the number of
users is very large. At the same time, we do not want to employ trusted hardware, and we
want to significantly minimize the work done by the PKG and users.
First we define the Revocable IBE primitive and its security model that formalizes the
possible threats. The model, of course, takes into account all adversarial capabilities of
the standard IBE security notion. I.e., the adversary should be able to learn private keys
of users with identities of its choice, and in the case of chosen-ciphertext attack, to also
see decryptions of messages (of its choosing) encrypted under the challenge identity. The
adversary should not be able to learn any partial information about the messages encrypted
for the challenge identity. In addition, we consider the adversary having access to periodic
key updates (as we assume this information is public), and being able to revoke users with
identities of its choice. The adversary should not be able to learn any partial information
about the messages encrypted for any revoked identity, if the message is encrypted after the
time of revocation (i.e., for the identity containing the time past the revocation time).
We show that it is possible to reduce the amount of work a PKG has to do for key
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updates and the total size of key updates to logarithmic in the number of users, while
keeping the key update process non-interactive, and encryption and decryption efficient.
Our idea is to build on the Fuzzy IBE construction by Sahai and Waters [83]. The Fuzzy
IBE primitive provides some sort of error-tolerance, i.e., identities are viewed as sets of
attributes, and a user can decrypt if it possesses keys for enough of (but not necessarily all)
attributes a ciphertext is encrypted under. At the same time, colluding users cannot combine
their keys to decrypt a ciphertext which none of them were able to decrypt independently.
We propose to combine the Fuzzy IBE construction from [83] with the binary tree data
structure, which was previously used to improve the efficiency of revocation mechanisms
in the PKI setting [76, 2]. In order to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted under an identity and
time period, the user must possess the keys for these two attributes. The PKG publicly
posts and regularly updates the keys for the current time attribute. Even though the time
attributes are the same for all users, this does not have to compromise security, thanks to
the collusion-resistance property of Fuzzy IBE. To reduce the size of key updates from
linear to logarithmic in the number of users, the binary tree data structure is used. Here, we
employ a trick to modify the Fuzzy IBE scheme in such a way that collusion of some users
(corresponding to non-revoked users in our scheme) on some attributes (i.e., time attribute)
is possible. We provide more details and present the full construction in Section 5.2.
While our scheme provides major computation and bandwidth efficiency improvements
at the stage of key update, it also permits efficient encryption and decryption. We show that
our scheme provably guarantees security assuming the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
problem is hard, which is a quite common assumption nowadays (cf. e.g., [31, 83, 88, 53]).
We also show two ways to address chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our first solution is to
modify our scheme by additionally employing a strongly-unforgeable one-time signature
scheme in a manner somewhat similar to [37, 53]. We also show that it is possible to
employ the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [43, 44]. Security of the latter solution relies
on the random oracle model [18], but unlike the former solution, it is generic, in that it can
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be applied to any Revocable IBE scheme.
Finally, we note that the problem of revocation is equally important for ABE schemes.
While the same periodic key update solution due to Boneh and Franklin applies, it similarly
limits scalability. We show that it is possible to extend our techniques to provide efficient
non-interactive key update to Fuzzy IBE [83] and Key-Policy ABE [53] schemes.
This is a joint work with Alexandra Boldyreva and Vipul Goyal. A preliminary version
of this work appeared at the 2008 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security [25], and a full version is available from IACR’s Cryptology ePrint Archive [26].
1.4 Organization and Conclusion
We first present our notations, and recall some definitions and results from prior works in
Chapter 2.
In Chapter 3, we present provable security analyses of the two types of authenticated
encryption schemes used in Kerberos version 5, called General Profile and Simplified Pro-
file. Our analyses complement the recent formal-methods-based symbolic analyses, and
together these results provide strong security guarantees for Kerberos that we believe will
help its standardization.
In Chapter 4, we present our hash-function-based PRG, which is very efficient (though
still not comparable to practical, standardized PRGs) and simple, as at each iteration it uses
a hash function and an inner-product computation, both of which are relatively fast. While
our construction is mainly of theoretical interest, we believe our approach and treatment
has moved theoretically sound PRGs much further toward practical use.
In Chapter 5, we present our last result solving the problem of efficient revocation in
IBEs and ABEs. While these encryption schemes are relatively less efficient compared
to public-key encryption schemes, they have already been used (and are very likely to be
used in future, as well) in many practical protocols due to their attractive features. Our
techniques and solutions have found applications in several varied areas of information
18
security.





LetN denote the set of natural numbers, andR denote the set of real numbers. We denote by
κ ∈ N our security parameter, and by n(·) a polynomial in κ. We say a function is negligible,
if it decreases faster than any polynomial. For any n ∈ N, let Zn denote the set of integers
modulo n, and Z∗n denote the set Zn \ 0. We denote by {0, 1}
∗ the set of all binary strings of
finite length. If x is a string, then |x| denotes its length in bits, and if x ∈ R, then |x| denotes
its absolute value. If x and y are strings, then 〈x, y〉 denotes their inner product modulo 2,
i.e.,
∑m
i=1 xi · ri (mod 2); and x ‖ y denotes their concatenation, and we assume that x and
y can be efficiently and unambiguously recovered from x ‖ y. For a string x, whose length
is a multiple of n ∈ N bits, x[i] denotes the ith block, meaning x = x[1]|| . . . ||x[l], where
l = |x|/n, and for all i = 1 to l, |x[i]| = n. For a string x, and any integers 0 ≤ i < j ≤ |x|,
x[i] denotes the ith bit of x, and x[i... j] denotes x[i] ‖ . . . ‖ x[ j]. For an integer k and a bit b, bk
denotes the string consisting of k consecutive “b” bits.
We denote by φ an empty set. If S is a finite set, then s
$
← S denotes that s is selected
uniformly at random from S. We will often write s1, s2, . . . , sn
$





← S; . . . ; sn
$
← S. If S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn}, then {xs}s∈S denotes the set {xs1 , xs2 , . . . , xsn}.
If f is a function, then Im( f ) denotes the image set of f , and for any y ∈ Im( f ),
Preim( f , y) denotes the set of preimages of y under f . For any a, b ∈ N, if a < b, then






When describing algorithms, a ← b denotes that a is assigned the value b. If A is a
randomized algorithm and n ∈ N, then a
$
← A(i1, i2, . . . , in) denotes that a is assigned the
outcome of running A on input (i1, i2, . . . , in); the dollar sign above the arrow is dropped
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if A is deterministic. An adversary is an algorithm. By convention, the running-time of
an adversary includes that of its overlying experiment. All algorithms are assumed to be
randomized and efficient (i.e., polynomial in the input size), and all functions are assumed
to be efficiently computable, unless noted otherwise.
2.2 Symmetric Encryption Schemes and their Security
Definition 2.2.1. [Symmetric Encryption Scheme] A symmetric encryption schemeSE =
(K ,E,D), with associated message space MsgSp, is defined by three algorithms:
• The randomized key generation algorithm K returns a secret key K.
• The (possibly) randomized or stateful encryption algorithm E takes as input the secret
key K and a plaintext M ∈ MsgSp, and returns a ciphertext.
• The deterministic decryption algorithm D takes the secret key K and a ciphertext
C to return the corresponding plaintext, or a special symbol ⊥ indicating that the
ciphertext was invalid.
The consistency condition requires that DK(EK(M)) = M, for all K that can be output
by K , and all M ∈ MsgSp.
We now recall cryptographic security notions for encryption. The following definition
[12] is for data privacy (confidentiality). It formalizes the requirement that even though an
adversary may know some partial information about the data, no additional information is
leaked.
Definition 2.2.2. [IND-CPA, IND-CCA] Let SE = (K ,E,D) be an encryption scheme.
For attack type atk ∈ {cpa, cca}, adversary A, and a bit b, define the experiments Expind-atk-b
SE
(A)
as follows. In all the experiments, first a key K is generated by K . Let LR (left-or-right)
be a “selector” that on input M0,M1, b returns Mb. The adversary A is given access to
a left-right encryption oracle EK(LR(·, ·, b)) that it can query on any pair of messages of
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equal length in MsgSp. For atk = cca, i.e., in Expind-cca-b
SE
(A), the adversary is also given
a decryption oracle DK(·) that it can query on any ciphertext that was not returned by the
other oracle. The adversary’s goal is to output a bit d as its guess of the challenge bit b; the
















The scheme SE is said to be indistinguishable against chosen-plaintext attacks or IND-
CPA (resp., chosen-ciphertext attacks or IND-CCA), if for every polynomial-time (in the
security parameter κ) adversary A, its ind-cpa (resp., ind-cca) advantage is negligible (in κ).
(We use the standard convention that the running time of an adversary is measured
with respect to the entire experiment in which it runs. In computing the total length of the
queries made to the LR encryption oracle, we only count the length of one of the messages
from the pair.)
It is easy to see that IND-CCA security is a stronger notion that implies IND-CPA
security.
The following definition [17, 19] is for authenticity and integrity of encryption. It
formalizes the requirement that no adversary should be able to compute a new ciphertext
which the receiver will deem valid.
Definition 2.2.3. [INT-CTXT] Let SE = (K ,E,D) be an encryption scheme. The encryp-
tion scheme is said to provide authenticity, or ciphertext integrity (be INT-CTXT secure),
if any polynomial-time (in κ) adversary A can be successful in the following experiment
only with negligible (in κ) probability, called the int-ctxt-advantage of A, Advint-ctxt
SE
(A). In
the experiment, first a key K is generated by K . The adversary has access to two oracles:
encryption oracle EK(·) and verification oracle VK(·). On input a ciphertext C, VK(·) re-
turns 1, if C was not returned by EK(·) and DK(C) , ⊥. The adversary is successful in the
experiment ifVK(·) ever returns 1.
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It has been shown [17] that if an encryption scheme is IND-CPA and INT-CTXT, then
it is also IND-CCA.
Theorem 2.2.4. [[17], Theorem 3.2] Let SE = (K ,E,D) be an encryption scheme. If
it is IND-CPA and INT-CTXT secure, then it is also IND-CCA secure. Concretely, for
any adversary A attacking the IND-CCA security of SE, that runs in time t, and makes qe
queries to the left-right encryption oracle, and qd queries to the decryption oracle, totaling
µe and µd bits, respectively, there exist adversaries B and C attacking the scheme’s IND-





(B) + 2 · Advint-ctxt
SE
(C) .
Furthermore, B runs in time1 t, and makes qe queries to the left-right encryption oracle,
totaling µe bits, while C runs in time t, and makes qe queries to the encryption oracle, and
qd queries to the verification oracle, totaling µe and µd bits, respectively.
2.3 PRFs, MACs, and their Security
A family of functions is a map E : Keys × Dom → Ran, where we regard Keys as the
keyspace for the function family in that a key K ∈ Keys induces a particular function from
this family, which we denote by EK(·).
Definition 2.3.1. [PRF] Let E : Keys × Dom → Ran be a function family. Let R be the
set of all functions from Dom to Ran. E is called pseudorandom, or PRF secure, if any
polynomial-time (in κ) adversary A, with access to an oracle that it can query on messages
in MsgSp, has negligible (in κ) prf-advantage defined as










← R : Ag(·) = 1
]
.
Definition 2.3.2. [MAC] A message authentication codeMAC = (K ,T ) with associated
message space MsgSp is defined by two algorithms:
1The time complexity given in [17] is slightly different due to the difference in convention.
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• The randomized key generation algorithm K returns a secret key K.
• The deterministic2 tagging algorithm T takes as input the secret key K, and a plain-
text M ∈ MsgSp to return a tag for M.
For a message-tag pair (M, σ), we say σ is a valid tag for M, if σ = σ′, where σ′ ←
TK(M).
The following security definition [13] requires that any polynomial-time (in κ) adver-
sary can forge a valid tag for a new message only with a negligible probability.
Definition 2.3.3. [UF-CMA] LetMAC = (K ,T ) be a MAC scheme. It is called unforge-
able against chosen-message attacks, or UF-CMA secure, if any polynomial-time (in κ)
adversary A can be successful in the following experiment with only a negligible probabil-
ity, called the uf-cma-advantage of A, Advuf-cma
MAC
(A). In the experiment, first a random key
K is generated by K . The adversary has access to two oracles: tagging oracle TK(·) and
verification oracle3VK(·, ·). On input a message-tag pair (m, σ),VK(·, ·) returns 1, if m was
not queried to TK(·), and TK(m) = σ, otherwise it returns 0. The adversary is successful in
the experiment ifVK(·, ·) ever returns 1.
Another (stronger) security definition requires that the output of the MAC is indistin-
guishable from a random string. The definition below is very similar to the PRF definition
for the function family. The only difference is that now a key generation algorithm is used
to generate the key.
Definition 2.3.4. [PRF Security for MACs] Let MAC = (K ,T ) be a MAC scheme.
Let R be the set of all functions with the same domain and range as T . MAC is called
pseudorandom, or PRF secure, if any polynomial-time (in κ) adversary A, with access to
2A MAC does not have to be deterministic, but most practical schemes are, so we consider only determin-
istic MACs.
3Since we only consider deterministic MACs, the verification oracle is not necessary. However, we keep
it for generality. In computing the total length of the queries made to the verification oracle, we only count
the length of message m, and not the message-tag pair (m, σ).
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← R : Ag(·) = 1
]
.
We recall the fact that any MAC that is PRF is also UF-CMA.
Theorem 2.3.5. [[20], Proposition 6.3] Let MAC = (K ,T ) be a MAC scheme. Then,
for any adversary F attacking UF-CMA security ofMAC, that runs in time t, and makes
qt queries to the tagging oracle, and qv queries to the verification oracle, totaling µt and µv










where RanT denotes the range of T . Furthermore, G runs in time t, and makes (qt + qv)
oracle queries, totaling (µt + µv) bits.
2.4 Encoding Schemes and their Security
An encoding scheme is an unkeyed invertible transformation that is used to extend the
message with some associated data, such as padding, a counter, random nonce, etc.
Definition 2.4.1. [Encoding Scheme] An encoding scheme EC = (Encode,Decode) with
associated message space MsgSp is defined by two algorithms. The (possibly) randomized
or stateful encoding algorithm Encode takes a message M ∈ MsgSp, and outputs a pair
of messages (Me,Mt). The deterministic decoding algorithm takes Me and returns a pair
(M,Mt), or (⊥,⊥) on error.
For any message M ∈ MsgSp, let (Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M), and (M′,M′t )← Decode(Me).
Then the consistency condition requires that M = M′ and Mt = M′t . We note that in the con-
structions we will consider, Me is going to be used as an input to the encryption algorithm,
and Mt is going to be used as an input to the MAC algorithm.
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The following is from [19, 15].
Definition 2.4.2. [Coll-CPA] Let EC = (Encode,Decode) be an encoding scheme. It is
called collision-resistant against chosen-plaintext attacks, or Coll-CPA, if any polynomial-
time (in κ) adversary A has only a negligible (in κ) success probability, called the coll-cpa-
advantage of A, or Advcoll-cpa
EC
(A), in the following experiment. The adversary has access
to the encoding oracle Encode(·), and it is considered successful if it ever gets two replies
(Me,Mt) and (M′e,M
′
t ), such that Mt = M
′
t .
2.5 Hash Function Families and their Security
Because of the known difficulties of defining collision-resistance (cf. Section 6.1 in [20]),
we follow the standard approach and define hash function families.
Definition 2.5.1. [Hash Function Family] A hash function family H is a collection of
functions, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n, such that m > n. An
instance h ∈ H may be described by a key which is publicly known.
Definition 2.5.2. [Collision-Resistance and Target Collision-Resistance] Let H be a
hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. The collision-
resistance advantage of an adversary C attackingH , Advcr
H





← H , x, x′
$













← H , x
$
← {0, 1}m, x′
$







Definition 2.5.3. [Birthday Attack] The birthday attack on a function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
is defined in Figure 1. In this attack, q ∈ N points x1, ..., xq are picked independently at
random from the domain. If any two of these points form a collision for f , then the attack
is successful and those two points are returned. We denote the probability of success of the
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yi ← f (xi)
If (∃ j : j < i
∧
yi = y j
∧
xi , x j), return (xi, x j).
Figure 1: Birthday Attack (function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, # of trials q)
birthday attack on f by collision probability, CP( f , q). We will slightly abuse the notation
sometimes, and use it for function families, where in CP(F , q) for a function family F ,
would mean the collision probability of a function picked at random from F .
Definition 2.5.4. [Regularity] A function f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n is said to be regular, if
every point in the image set of f have equal number of preimages. Bellare and Kohno
introduced the notion of a balance measure, denoted µ( f ) (cf. Section 1 in [14]) to measure
the regularity of a function: µ( f ) = 1 indicates that the function is fully regular, and µ( f ) =
0 means fully irregular (an image point has the maximum number of preimages). The





·2−nµ( f ) (up to constant
factors), so the collision-resistance of any function degrades exponentially (in the range of
the function) with the decline in its balance. A collision-resistant hash function (CRHF)
must therefore have a balance close to 1, and experiments on practical hashes like SHA-1
support this claim (cf. Equation 2, Section 11 in [14]). So, SHA-1 and other hash functions
(SHA-256, SHA-512, etc.) can be assumed to be close to regular. We introduce a notion
that we call worst-case regularity in Section 4.4 that also captures this closeness.
Definition 2.5.5. [One-Wayness] Let F be a family of functions, where each f ∈ F is
a mapping from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. The one-way advantage of an adversary I attacking F ,
Advow
F





← F , x
$
← {0, 1}m, x′
$
← I( f , f (x)) : x′ ∈ {0, 1}m
∧
f (x′) = f (x)
]
.
The one-way advantage of a function f (instead of a function family) can be defined
similarly: the adversary is given f (x) for a random x, and it has to return an element
x′ ∈ {0, 1}m such that f (x′) = f (x).
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The following relation between target collision-resistance and one-wayness of a func-
tion is well-known.
Theorem 2.5.6. [[20], Corollary 5.5] LetH be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H
is a mapping from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. Then for an adversary I with running time tI , there
exists an adversary C with running time tC, so that
Advow
H
(I) ≤ 2 · Advtcr
H
(C) + 2n−m, and tC ≈ tI .
We now present a more general definition that also captures the one-wayness.
Definition 2.5.7. [Hard to Compute] Let f and g be functions with the same domain






← S m : I( f (x)) ∈ Preim(g, f (x))
]
.
Note that for any adversary I and any function f , Advowf (I) = Adv
htc
f , f (I).
Definition 2.5.8. [Hardcore Predicate] Informally, a hardcore predicate is a bit of the
input that is hard to predict significantly better than a random guess. Formally, let g :
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, b : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be two functions, and a
$
← {0, 1} be a random bit.











← {0, 1}m : A(g(x), a) = 1
]
.
Here b(x) is called the hardcore predicate (or bit) of g(x). In this paper, we use the gen-
eral hardcore predicate construction of Goldreich and Levin [49], called the “GL-hardcore
bit”. For two bitstrings x (= x1‖ . . . ‖xm) and r (= r1‖ . . . ‖rm), define b(x, r) = 〈x, r〉, the
inner product of x and r modulo 2. The following theorem is from [55], and states (using
our notation) the security of the GL-hardcore bit.
Theorem 2.5.9. [Theorem 2.7, [55]] Let f and g be functions with the same domain S m ⊆
{0, 1}m. For a random x ∈ S m and a random r ∈ {0, 1}m, define f̂ as f̂ (x, r) = ( f (x), r), and
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its GL-hardcore bit b as 〈z, r〉, where z ∈ Preim(g, f (x)) is one of the preimages of f (x)
under g. Then for an adversary A with running time tA, there exists an adversary I with
running time tI , so that
Advhcp
f̂ ,b
(A) ≤ 4 · Advhtcf ,g(I), and tI = O
(








Informally, a pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a function that expands a random seed into
a longer pseudorandom bit sequence. PRGs were first proposed and constructed by Blum
and Micali [24], and Yao [91]. Let G : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}l be a function, so that l > m. We say
that G is a secure PRG, if for any polynomial-time (in the security parameter κ) adversary













← {0, 1}l : P(y) = 1
]
,
is negligible (in κ). Here m is the seed length, and l is the number of pseudorandom bits
generated.
2.7 Bilinear Maps
Let G,GT be groups of prime order p (so they are cyclic). A pairing is an efficiently
computable map e : G × G→ GT such that the following two conditions hold:
• Bilinearity: For all g1, g2 ∈ G and x, y ∈ Z, we have e(gx1, g
y
2) = e(g1, g2)
xy.
• Non-degeneracy: For any generator g of G, e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
Note that e(·, ·) is symmetric, since e(gx, gy) = e(g, g)xy = e(gy, gx).
A bilinear group generator G is an algorithm that on input 1κ returns G̃ (which is a
description of groups G and GT , both of order p), the bilinear map e as defined above,
and also p and a generator g of G. There can be numerous such prime order bilinear group
generators. We will not specify a particular one but will use it as a parameter to the hardness
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assumption that we use for our security proof. The description of a group should specify
the algorithms for group operations (multiplication, inverse and pairing), the algorithm for
testing group membership, and also the random group element sampling algorithm. We
assume that the group elements are uniquely encoded as strings.
Below we recall a hardness assumption related to bilinear maps, called the decisional
bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem.
Definition 2.7.1. [Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman] Let G be a prime order bilinear
group generator. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) problem is said to be
hard for G if for every efficient adversary A its advantage AdvdbdhG (A) defined as
Pr
[




Expdbdh-randG (A) = 1
]




← G(1κ) ; x, y, z
$
← Zp
X ← gx ; Y ← gy ; Z ← gz ; W ← e(g, g)xyz
d
$





← G(1κ) ; x, y, z,w
$
← Zp
X ← gx ; Y ← gy ; Z ← gz ; W ← e(g, g)w
d
$




SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION IN KERBEROS
In this chapter, we present our first set of results: provable security analyses of encryption
schemes used in Kerberos v.5. This chapter is organized in two sections. In Section 3.1, we
present our analyses of the most widely used encryption in Kerberos, that we call General
Profile, and in Section 3.2, we analyze a recently proposed encryption, called Simplified
Profile, that implementations are still catching up with.
3.1 General Profile
We first look at the encryption scheme specified in [82]. This document describes several
options, but we note that all the choices conform to a general composition method that we
outline below (the design is further generalized in [65]).
Construction 3.1.1. [Encode-then-Checksum-then-Encrypt] LetSE = (Ke,E,D), EC =
(Encode, Decode), and CS = (Kt,T ) be an encryption scheme, an encoding scheme, and a
checksum (i.e., a hash, or a MAC). Then the Encode-then-Checksum-then-Encrypt scheme
SE
′ = (K ′,E′,D′), with the same message space as that of EC, is defined by a tuple of
three algorithms as follows:
• K ′ runs Ke,Kt, and returns their outputs Ke ‖ Kt.
• E′ on input Ke ‖ Kt and M, first gets the encodings via (Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M). It
then computes σ ← TKt(Mt), parses Me as Mel‖Mer (Mel and Mer are the left and
right parts of Me, respectively), and returns C
$
← EKe(Mel ‖ σ ‖ Mer).
• D′ on input Ke‖Kt and C, computes Me ← Mel‖Mer, σ from (Mel‖σ‖Mer)← DKe(C),














Figure 2: Encode-then-Checksum-then-Encrypt Paradigm
Above, we assume that the outputs of the encoding scheme are compatible with the
inputs to E and T . Figure 2 illustrates the design.
The next construction specifies in more detail how Kerberos’ encryption operates, i.e.,
what specific algorithms instantiate the generic composition method of Construction 3.1.1.
Construction 3.1.2. [Authenticated Encryption in Kerberos: General Profile] Let E :
{0, 1}k ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a family of permutations, to be referred as a blockcipher.
Let SE = (Ke,E,D) be the associated CBC encryption mode (cf. [12] for the formal
description), with IV = 0n 1. Let H be a hash function family2 (to be used as checksum
CS), where each h ∈ H is a mapping from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}l. Let EC = (Encode,Decode) be
an encoding scheme, such that Encode with MsgSp = {0, 1}∗, on input M, pads it to make
the length of (l+ |M|) a multiple of n bits (so that decoding is unambiguous), picks a random
1The Kerberos specification also allows stateful update of the IV . In particular, the IV is assigned to be
the last block of the previous ciphertext. Our analyses apply to this case as well. But, since this option is not
commonly used, we do not consider it in detail. We note, however, that [82] does not specify how the state
and IV are updated when the receiver gets an invalid ciphertext. The only reasonable resolution preventing
malicious attacks disrupting the future communication may be to issue an error message and reset the IV to
0n.
2This can be keyless, which means that the family contains just one function.
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confounder of n bits con f
$
← {0, 1}n, computes Me ← con f ‖ M, and Mt ← con f ‖ 0l ‖ M,
and returns (Me,Mt). Mel is defined to be con f , and Mer is the rest of Me. Decode on
input Me parses it as con f ‖M, computes Mt ← con f ‖0l‖M, and returns (M,Mt). Then
Construction 3.1.1 describes the authenticated encryption called General Profile3.
3.1.1 Security Analysis
Some supported instantiations include DES as the blockcipher, and MD4 and MD5 as
the hash function. These are not good choices for known reasons. DES is an outdated
standard, since its key and block sizes are too small considering modern computing power,
and collisions have been found in MD4 and MD5 [87]. However, what our results show
is that using the “more secure” building blocks, such as AES and a collision-resistant hash
function, will not necessarily solve the problem. More precisely, we can neither prove,
nor disprove the security of the General profile in this case. What we can show is that
the Encode-then-Checksum-then-Encrypt composition method does not provide integrity
in general when it uses a hash function as a checksum, even if it uses a secure encryption
option for the underlying encryption scheme. We note that the theorem below does not
imply that the General Profile (Construction 3.1.2) is insecure, but it shows the limitation
of its underlying general design (Construction 3.1.1), when used with the given encoding
scheme.
Theorem 3.1.3. Let EC = (Encode,Decode) be the encoding scheme, defined in Construc-
tion 3.1.2. There exists an IND-CPA secure encryption scheme, and a collision-resistant
hash function, so that the authenticated encryption obtained via Encode-then-Checksum-
then-Encrypt (Construction 3.1.1), does not provide integrity (is not INT-CTXT secure).




3Our analysis does not take into account stateful approaches for key derivation used in few options of
General profile.
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We present two alternative proofs of insecurity of the Encode-then-Checksum-then-
Encrypt paradigm used in General Profile authenticated encryption. The first proof uses a
natural encryption scheme and a not-so-natural hash function as a checksum. The second
proof uses a special encryption scheme, but the checksum can be instantiated with arbitrary
secure MAC. The attacks we provide are similar to those in [17, 66] that show insecurity
of several general composition methods. We repeat that the attacks that we provide in the
proof do not translate into an attack on any of the recommended options, because we use a
special type of hash function/encryption scheme. They still show limitations in the general
composition method.
First Proof of Theorem 3.1.3. Before presenting the proof, we give a high level idea. We
show that the general authenticated encryption paradigm underlying General Profile does
not preserve integrity of ciphertexts when instantiated with stateful counter (CTR) mode
of the encryption scheme and a collision-resistant hash function that happens to leak the
first bit of its input. The CTR mode of encryption is somewhat similar to the one-time pad,
where the underlying blockcipher is applied to a counter to generate a pseudorandom pad
which is then xor’ed with the message. Now, the ingenuity of our attack lies in showing
that given any ciphertext that was output by the above scheme, one can produce another
valid ciphertext by simply flipping the bits at two different positions, namely the first bit of
the first and second blocks of the ciphertext. We repeat that the attack does not apply to the
General Profile scheme itself.
Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and let SE = (Ke,E,D) be the
associated stateful counter encryption scheme, known as CTR or xor encryption mode
(cf. [12]). Its key generation algorithm Ke simply returns a random k-bit string Ke. The
encryption algorithm E is stateful and maintains a counter ctr that is initially 0. E takes the
key Ke, the current counter ctr, and a message M (padded if necessary to a length multiple
of n bits), and outputs ctr ‖ C[1] ‖ C[2] ‖ ... ‖ C[m], where m is the total number of blocks,
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, C[i] ← Mi ⊕ EKe(〈ctr + i〉). Here 〈i〉 denotes the n-bit representation of
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an integer i. Next, E updates the counter to ctr + m + 1. The decryption algorithmD takes
Ke and a ciphertext ctr ‖C[1] ‖ ... ‖C[m], and outputs M[1] ‖ ... ‖M[m], where for 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
M[i] ← C[i] ⊕ EKe(〈ctr + i〉). The CTR encryption mode is proven to be IND-CPA secure
if E is a PRF [12].
Let H be a collision-resistant hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping
from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}l. Consider a modified hash function family H ′, i.e. every h ∈ H is





We show thatH ′ is also collision-resistant.
For any adversary A that can find collisions inH ′, we construct an adversary B that can
find collisions in H . When A returns two messages M′,N′, B computes M ← M′[1...|M′ |−1],











If h′(M′) = h′(N′), and M′ , N′, then it is easy to see that h(M) = h(N), and M , N. B
is almost as efficient as A. Therefore, ifH is collision resistant, then so isH ′.
We now present an adversary I that breaks the INT-CTXT security of the scheme de-
scribed by Construction 3.1.1 when it uses CTR encryption mode and modified hash func-
tion family H ′ as SE and CS, respectively. I selects an arbitrary n-bit-long message M
and queries it to the encryption oracle. Let ctr‖C be the oracle’s reply. I then queries the
ciphertext ctr‖C′ to the verification oracle, where C′ is computed from C by flipping the
first bit of the first and second blocks.
We claim that the int-ctxt advantage of I is 1. This is justified as follows. Con-
sider con f ‖σ‖M = DKe(ctr‖C). Here, σ = h






ctr‖C can be parsed as ctr‖C[1]‖C[2]‖D, where C[1] and C[2] are the first and second
blocks of C, and D is the remaining part of C. From the description of CTR encryption
mode it is clear that




















⊕ EKe(〈ctr + 2〉).
Let us denote the ciphertext blocks produced by flipping the first bit of C[1] and C[2]














⊕ EKe(〈ctr + 2〉).
Let us denote the decryption of ctr‖C′ by (M′el‖σ
′‖M′er). So we have M
′
el = (con f[0]‖con f[1...n−1]),












l+1‖M′er) = (con f[0]‖con f[1...n−1])‖0
l+1‖M.
It is clear Mt[1...|Mt |−1] = M
′
t[1...|M′t |−1]
because Mt and M′t differ only in first bit. So from
above, we have
σ′ = con f[0]‖h(Mt[1...|Mt |−1]) = con f[0]‖h(M
′
t[1...|M′t |−1]
) = h′(M′t ).
Thus, (M′t , σ
′) is a valid message-tag pair. Hence ctr‖C′ is a valid ciphertext that was
never returned by the encryption oracle, and therefore, the int-ctxt advantage of I is 1.
I makes one oracle query of length n bits, and performs two operations of bit comple-
mentation. 
Second Proof of Theorem 3.1.3. Our second proof is relatively simpler than the first one.
We show that the general authenticated encryption paradigm underlying General Profile
does not preserve integrity of ciphertexts when instantiated with any arbitrary encoding
scheme, an unforgeable MAC, and a special type of IND-CPA secure encryption scheme
whose encryption algorithm prepends zero to the ciphertext and the decryption algorithm
simply ignores the first bit of the ciphertext. In the Encode-then-Checksum-then-Encrypt
paradigm, encryption is the last step. So, with the above mentioned special type of encryp-
tion, one can easily produce a new valid ciphertext C′, given any ciphertext C output by the
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above scheme by flipping the first bit of C. We repeat that the attack does not apply to the
General Profile scheme itself.
Let SE = (Ke,E,D) be any IND-CPA secure encryption scheme. Consider a modified
encryption scheme SE′′ = (Ke,E′′,D′′), where E′′ on input key Ke and a message M
outputs 0‖EKe(M), and D





is easy to see that if SE is IND-CPA secure, then so is SE′′ (cf. [17], Proof of IND-CPA
security of SE2, at the end of Section 3). Let MAC = (Kt,T ) be any UF-CMA secure
MAC.
We present an adversary I attacking INT-CTXT security of the scheme described by
Construction 3.1.1 when it uses SE′′ andMAC as the encryption and checksum compo-
nent schemes. Note that we did not make any assumption about the encoding scheme, so
this attack works for any arbitrary encoding scheme. I selects an arbitrary short message
M in the message space of the scheme. It queries this message to the encryption oracle and
gets back ciphertext C. I then flips the first bit of C and queries the resulting ciphertext
C′ = 1‖C[1...|C|−1] to the verification oracle.
It is clear that C′ , C, and C′ is a valid ciphertext, because D′′ ignores the first bit of
ciphertext; therefore, D′′Ke(C
′) = D′′Ke(C) = M. Thus, the int-ctxt advantage of I is 1. I
makes only one oracle query of length |M|, and performs one bit complementation. 
3.1.2 Modified General Profile
We now suggest simple and easy-to-implement modifications to the General profile con-
struction, and show that they are sufficient to prove the security of the scheme. Namely, we
suggest to use a secure MAC in place of the hash function, and show that the resulting au-
thenticated encryption scheme is secure. Note that this does not contradict Theorem 3.1.3,
because now we look at the particular encryption scheme that the General profile uses
(Construction 3.1.2), i.e., CBC with zero IV. We now define the construction, and state its
security.
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Construction 3.1.4. [Modified General profile] The construction is like Construction 3.1.2,
except that a message authentication codeMAC = (Kt,T ) is used as checksum CS.
Theorem 3.1.5. The authenticated encryption scheme described by the Modified General
Profile (Construction 3.1.4) is INT-CTXT and IND-CCA secure, if the underlying blockci-
pher is a PRF, and the underlying checksum (MAC) is a PRF.
Concretely, let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and SE = (Ke,E,D) be
the CBC encryption mode with IV = 0n, that uses E. LetMAC = (Kt,T ) be a message
authentication code with output of length l. Let EC = (Encode,Decode) be an encoding
scheme, and SE′ = (K ′,E′,D′) be the authenticated encryption scheme associated to them
by Modified General Profile (Construction 3.1.4). Then, for any adversary I attacking the
INT-CTXT security of SE′, that runs in time t, and makes q′e queries to the encryption
oracle, and qv queries to the verification oracle, totaling µ′e and µv bits, respectively, there






Furthermore, F runs in time t, and makes q′e queries to the tagging oracle,and qv queries to
the verification oracle, totaling at most µ′e + q
′
e · (2n + l − 1) and µv + qv · (2n + l − 1) bits,
respectively.
And for any adversary A attacking the IND-CCA security of SE′, that runs in time t, and
makes qe queries to the left-right encryption oracle and qd queries to the decryption oracle,
totaling µe and µd bits, respectively, there exist adversaries B and G attacking PRF security
of E andMAC, respectively, such that
Advind-cca
SE′










Furthermore, B runs in time t, and makes at most b(µe + qe · (2n + l − 1)/n)c oracle queries,
totaling at most µe + qe · (2n + l− 1) bits; G runs in time t, and makes qe + qd oracle queries,
totaling at most µe + µd + (qe + qd)(2n + l − 1) bits.
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Next we present the proof. Note that the INT-CTXT security of the scheme requires
only UF-CMA security of the checksum (MAC), while IND-CCA security relies on it being
a PRF. As we mentioned before, any PRF MAC is also UF-CMA (Theorem 2.3.5), so PRF
security is a sufficient assumption.
AES is believed to be a PRF, and HMAC was shown to be a PRF [10], assuming the un-
derlying compression function is a PRF (cf. [10] for the definition of the latter). Therefore,
these schemes constitute good instantiations for the above design.
Proof of Theorem 3.1.5. INT-CTXT security. We will reduce the integrity of ciphertexts
of the Modified General Profile to the unforgeability of the underlying MAC scheme. The
attack in First Proof of Theorem 3.1.3 shows that a collision-resistant hash function is
not sufficient for integrity of ciphertexts. Moreover, from the attack in Second Proof of
Theorem 3.1.3, we know that even an unforgeable MAC cannot provide integrity of cipher-
texts if used with any general IND-CPA secure encryption scheme. At a high level, we
need an unforgeable MAC, and the encryption scheme is required to have the following
property for integrity of ciphertexts: for any pair of ciphertexts c, c′, if c , c′ then m , m′,
where m,m′ are the corresponding plaintexts. It is easy to see that while CBC with zero
IV mode of encryption (or, any other standard deterministic encryption mode) satisfies this
property, it may not necessarily hold for any general IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.
We now justify Eq. (1). Let I be an adversary attacking the INT-CTXT security of SE′.
We construct a forger F breaking the UF-CMA security ofMAC. F first runsKe to obtain
a key Ke for E. It runs I and replies to its queries as follows.
For every encryption oracle query M that I makes, F does the following: It computes
(Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M), and then it queries Mt to its own tagging oracle. Let us call the
oracle’s reply σ. Next, F parses Me as Mel‖Mer, and forms Mel‖σ‖Mer. Then, it computes
C ← EKe(Mel‖σ‖Mer) and returns C to I.
For every verification oracle query C that I makes, F does the following: It computes
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Mel‖σ‖Mer ← DKe(C) and Mt ← Decode(Me), where Me = Mel‖Mer. Next, F queries
(Mt, σ) to its own verification oracle, then returns 1 to I if the same was returned by its own
oracle.
We now analyze F. We claim that F is successful whenever I is successful. First of all,
it is straightforward to see that F correctly simulates the encryption oracle for I. Now, if I
is successful, then one of its verification oracle queries C′ is such that it was not returned
by the encryption oracle (i.e. it’s new), and its decryption does not return ⊥. This means






′), because the base encryption
schemeSE is deterministic (CBC with zero IV). If (M′el‖σ





or σ′ must be new, which is equivalent to saying that either M′el‖0
n‖M′er(= M
′
t ) or σ
′ must
be new. This gives rise to two cases. The first case is when M′t is new (σ
′ may or may not
be new in this case). It is clear that in this case (M′t , σ
′) is a valid new message-tag pair.
Hence F’s verification oracle will return 1.
The second case is when only σ′ is new, and M′t is old, i.e. M
′
t is one of the messages
that was queried to the tagging oracle. But then in this case, σ′ is an invalid tag, as the
tagging algorithm is deterministic, and the distinct valid tag was returned as the answer to
the corresponding query to the tagging oracle. Hence decryption of C′ will return ⊥.
Hence, the uf-cma advantage of F is the same as the int-ctxt advantage of I. The time
complexity of F is basically that of I. F makes the same number of oracle queries as that
of I. The total length of all the queries made by F exceeds that of I by only a fixed number
of bits, which is the number of queries times (2n + l − 1), due to the use of encoding (at
most n − 1 bits for padding, n bits for confounder, and l bits for tag).
We now claim the IND-CPA security of SE′. IND-CCA security will then follow from
the IND-CPA security and INT-CTXT security of the scheme.
IND-CPA security. We show that the composed encryption schemeSE′ is IND-CPA secure
if the underlying blockcipher is a PRF and the underlying MAC is a PRF.
Lemma 3.1.6. For any adversary S attacking IND-CPA security of SE′, that runs in time
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t, and makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, totaling µ bits, there exist adver-
saries B and G attacking PRF security of E andMAC, such that
Advind-cpa
SE′







Furthermore, B runs in time t and makes at most bµ + q · (2n + l − 1)/n)c oracle queries,
totaling at most µ+ q · (2n + l−1) bits; G runs in time t and makes q oracle queries, totaling
at most µ + q · (2n + l − 1) bits.
Proof of Lemma 3.1.6. We will first show that if the underlying MAC is PRF, then the en-
cryption in the Modified General Profile is similar in terms of security to CBC encryption
with random IV (Claim 3.1.7). Next, from the well known result of [20] (Claim 3.1.8),
we know that CBC encryption with random IV is IND-CPA secure if the underlying block-
cipher is a PRF. So, Lemma 3.1.6 will follow immediately from Claim 3.1.7 and Claim 3.1.8.

Claim 3.1.7. For any adversary S attacking IND-CPA security of SE′, that runs in time t,
and makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, totaling µ bits, there exists an ad-
versary D attacking IND-CPA security of CBC encryption scheme with random IV CBC$
= (Ke,E$,D$), and an adversary G attacking PRF security ofMAC, such that
Advind-cpa
SE′




Furthermore, D runs in time t and makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, total-
ing at most (µ + q · (2n + l − 1)) bits; G runs in time t and makes q oracle queries, totaling
at most (µ + q · (2n + l − 1)) bits.
We recall a fact from [20].
Claim 3.1.8. [[20], Theorem 4.19] Let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and
let CBC$ = (Ke,E$,D$) be the associated CBC encryption scheme with random IV (cf.
[12]). Then for any adversary D attacking IND-CPA security of CBC$, that runs in time t
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and makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, totaling µ n-bit blocks, there exists
an adversary B attacking PRF security of E, such that






Furthermore, B runs in time4 t and makes µ oracle queries, totaling µn bits.
Proof of Claim 3.1.7. At a high level the proof follows from the observation that the en-
coding scheme of Modified General Profile prepends a random confounder to the plaintext.
So encrypting this encoded message using CBC with zero IV is equivalent to encrypting
any message using CBC with “pseudorandom” IV, because the underlying blockcipher is
assumed to be a PRF.
Let S be an adversary attacking IND-CPA security of SE′. For x ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, we















Parse Me and Ne as Mel‖Mer and Nel‖Ner, where |Mel| = |Nel| = n
Switch (x):
Case x = 0: σ← TKt(Mt); C ← EKe(Mel‖σ‖Mer)
Case x = 1: C ← EKe(Mel‖r‖Mer)
Case x = 2: IV‖C
$
← E$Ke(Mel‖r‖Mer)
Case x = 3: IV‖C
$
← E$Ke(Nel‖r‖Ner)
Case x = 4: C ← EKe(Nel‖r‖Ner)
Case x = 5: σ← TKt(Nt); C ← EKe(Nel‖σ‖Ner)
Return C to S .
When S halts and outputs a bit, return that bit.
4Due to the difference in convention, this time complexity is different from the one given in [20].
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denote the probability that ExpHx returns
1. By the definition of Advind-cpa
SE′
(S ), we have
Advind-cpa
SE′
(S ) = P5 − P0 = (P5 − P4) + (P4 − P3) + (P3 − P2) + (P2 − P1) + (P1 − P0) . (3)
We first show that for S , ExpH1 is indistinguishable from ExpH2. In ExpH1, (Mel‖r‖Mer)
is encrypted using the CBC mode with zero IV, and the whole ciphertext is returned to S ,
while in ExpH2, (Mel‖r‖Mer) is encrypted using the CBC mode with random IV, and the
whole ciphertext, except the IV, is returned to S . Note that in the latter case, the ciphertext
given to S has the form of ((Mel ⊕ IV)‖r‖Mer) encrypted using the CBC mode with zero
IV. However, since Mel and IV are uniformly random strings, to an adversary that doesn’t
know these in advance, Mel and (Mel ⊕ IV) are indistinguishable. Hence, adversary S
cannot distinguish between ExpH1 and ExpH2. The same argument applies to show that
experiments ExpH3 and ExpH4 are indistinguishable in S ’s view. Hence, (P4 − P3) =
(P2 − P1) = 0. Thus, we have
Advind-cpa
SE′
(S ) = (P5 − P4) + (P3 − P2) + (P1 − P0) . (4)
Given S , there exist adversaries D and G, such that the following claims hold, and these
adversaries use the resources specified in Claim 3.1.7.
Claim 3.1.9. P3 − P2 ≤ Advind-cpaCBC$ (D) .
Claim 3.1.10. (P5 − P4) + (P1 − P0) ≤ 2 · AdvprfMAC(G) .
Eq. (4) and the above claims imply Claim 3.1.7. 
Proof of Claim 3.1.9. We construct an adversary D breaking the IND-CPA security of







← {0, 1}l. Next, it parses
Me and Ne as Mel‖Mer and Nel‖Ner, and it queries (Mel‖r‖Mer, Nel‖r‖Ner) to its own oracle
to get back IV‖C, where IV is the first ciphertext block. D forwards C back to S . When S
halts and returns a bit, D halts and outputs that bit.
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We analyze D. The view of S in ExpH2 is indistinguishable from that in Exp
ind-cpa-0
CBC$ (D),
and the view of S in ExpH3 is indistinguishable from that in Exp
ind-cpa-1
CBC$ (D). Thus, P3 −
P2 ≤ Advind-cpaCBC$ (D).
The time complexity of D is basically that of S . D makes the same number of oracle
queries as S . The total length of all the queries made by D exceeds that of S by only a
fixed number of bits, which is the number of queries times (2n + l − 1), due to the use of
encoding (at most (n − 1) bits for padding, n bits for confounder, and l bits for tag). 
Proof of Claim 3.1.10. We construct adversaries G1 and G2 breaking the PRF security of
MAC using adversary S such that




G1 runs Ke to obtain a key Ke. For every message-pair query (M,N) that S makes, G1
first computes (Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M). Then it queries Mt to its oracle. Let’s call the
oracle’s reply σ. Next, it parses Me as Mel‖Mer, forms Mel‖σ‖Mer, and computes C ←
EKe(Mel‖σ‖Mer). G1 forwards C back to S . When S halts and returns a bit, G1 halts and
outputs the complement bit.
We analyze G1. When G1 is in the first experiment of Definition 2.3.4, then σ =
TKt(Mt), so G1 simulates ExpH0 perfectly, and when G1 is in the second experiment of
Definition 2.3.4, then σ is a random n-bit string, so G1 simulates experiment ExpH1 per-
fectly. Hence, (P1 − P0) ≤ AdvprfMAC(G1).
Adversary G2 can be constructed in a similar way, where for every message-pair query




The time complexities of G1,G2 are basically that of S . G1,G2 make the same number
of oracle queries as that of S . The total length of all the queries made by G1,G2 exceed
that of S by only a fixed number of bits, which is number of queries times (2n + l − 1), due
to the use of encoding (at most (n− 1) bits for padding, n bits for confounder, and l bits for
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tag).
Putting G to be one of the adversaries G1,G2 with the larger prf-advantage we get
Advprf
MAC




Thus, Claim 3.1.10 follows. 
IND-CCA security. Eq. (1), Lemma 3.1.6, Theorem 2.2.4, and Theorem 2.3.5 imply Eq. (2).

3.2 Simplified Profile
Kerberos designers proposed a new construction that they call “Simplified Profile” (cf.
Section 5 in [82], and [81]). Again, we start with a more general composition method that
outlines the design.
Construction 3.2.1. [Encode-then-Encrypt&MAC] Let SE = (Ke,E,D),MAC = (Kt,
T ), and EC = (Encode,Decode) be an encryption scheme, a MAC scheme, and an en-
coding scheme. The message space of corresponding Encode-then-Encrypt&MAC scheme
SE
′ = (K ′,E′,D′), is that of EC, and the algorithms are defined as follows:
• K ′ runs Ke,Kt, and returns their outputs Ke ‖ Kt.
• E′ on inputs Ke ‖ Kt and M, first gets the encodings via (Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M). It
then computes C ← EKe(Me), σ← TKt(Mt), and returns C ‖ σ.
• D′ on inputs Ke ‖ Kt and C ‖ σ, computes Me ← DKe(C), decodes (M,Mt) ←
Decode(Me), computes σ′ ← TKt(Mt), and returns M, if σ = σ
′, and ⊥ otherwise.
Above we assume that the outputs of the encoding scheme are compatible with the inputs
to E,T .









Figure 3: Encode-then-Encrypt&MAC Paradigm
Construction 3.2.2. [Authenticated encryption in Kerberos: Simplified profile] Let
E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher. Let SE = (Ke,E,D) be the associated
CBC encryption mode with IV = 0n. Let MAC = (Kt,T ) be a MAC scheme. Let
EC = (Encode,Decode) be an encoding scheme, such that Encode with MsgSp = {0, 1}∗
on input M pads M to make its length a multiple of n bits (while permitting unambiguous
decoding), picks a random confounder of n bits con f
$
← {0, 1}n, computes Me ← con f ‖M,
and Mt ← con f ‖ M, and returns (Me,Mt). Decode on input Me, parses it as con f ‖M,
computes Mt ← Me, and returns (M,Mt). Then Construction 3.2.1 describes the Simplified
Profile of authenticated encryption in Kerberos.
3.2.1 Security Analysis
The following theorem states that the Simplified Profile provides strong security guaran-
tees.
Theorem 3.2.3. The authenticated encryption scheme SE′, described by the Simplified
Profile (Construction 3.2.2), is INT-CTXT and IND-CCA secure, if the underlying block-
cipher E is a PRF and the underlying MAC is a PRF.
Concretely, let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and SE = (Ke,E,D) be the
CBC encryption mode with IV = 0n that uses E. LetMAC = (Km,T ) be a MAC scheme
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and EC = (Encode,Decode) be an encoding scheme. Let SE′ be the authenticated encryp-
tion scheme associated to them by Simplified Profile (Construction 3.2.2). Then, for any
adversary I attacking INT-CTXT security of SE′, that runs in time t, and makes q′e queries
to the encryption oracle, and qv queries to the verification oracle, totaling µ′e and µv bits,






Furthermore, F runs in time t and makes q′e queries to the tagging oracle and qv queries to
the verification oracle, totaling at most µ′e +q
′
e ·(2n−1) and µv +qv ·(2n−1) bits, respectively.
And for any adversary A attacking IND-CCA security of SE′, that runs in time t and makes
qe queries to the left-right encryption oracle, and qd queries to the decryption oracle, total-
ing µe and µd bits, respectively, there exist adversaries B and G attacking PRF security of
E andMAC, respectively, such that
Advind-cca
SE′













where RanT denotes the set of outputs of T . Furthermore, B runs in time t and makes at
most b(µe + qe · (2n − 1)/n)c oracle queries, totaling at most µe + qe · (2n − 1) bits; G runs
in time t and makes qe + qd oracle queries, totaling at most µe + µd + (qe + qd) · (2n− 1) bits.
Next we present the proof. Note that INT-CTXT security of the scheme requires only
UF-CMA security of the MAC, while IND-CCA security relies on the MAC being a PRF.
As we mentioned before, any PRF MAC is also UF-CMA (Theorem 2.3.5), so PRF security
is a sufficient assumption. Also, AES is believed to be a PRF, and HMAC was shown to
be a PRF [10], assuming the underlying compression function is a PRF (cf. [10] for the
definition of the latter notion). Therefore, these schemes constitute good instantiations for
the above design.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.3. INT-CTXT security. We will reduce the integrity of ciphertexts
of Simplified Profile to the unforgeability of the underlying MAC scheme. First, we note
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that an attack similar to that in Second Proof of Theorem 3.1.3 can be mounted on Sim-
plified Profile, too. Hence, as pointed out in Section 3.1.2, for the integrity of ciphertexts
it is necessary that the encryption scheme satisfies the following property: for any pair of
ciphertexts c, c′, if c , c′ then m , m′, where m,m′ are the corresponding plaintexts. In
addition, we point out again that while CBC with zero IV mode of encryption (or, any other
standard deterministic encryption mode) satisfies this property, it may not necessarily hold
for any general IND-CPA secure encryption scheme.
We justify Eq. (5). Let I be an adversary attacking INT-CTXT security of SE′. We
construct a forger F breaking the UF-CMA security ofMAC. F first runs Ke to obtain a
key Ke for E. It runs I and replies to its queries as follows.
For every encryption oracle query M that I makes, F does the following: It computes
(Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M) and then queries Mt to its own tagging oracle. Let us call the
oracle’s reply σ. Next, F computes C ← EKe(Me) and returns C‖σ to I.
For every verification oracle query C‖σ that I makes, F does the following: It computes
Me ← DKe(C) and Mt ← Decode(Me). Next, F queries (Mt, σ) to its own verification
oracle and returns 1 to I, if the same was returned by its own oracle.
We now analyze F. We claim that F is successful whenever I is successful. First of
all, it is straightforward to see that F correctly simulates the encryption oracle for I. Now,
if I is successful, then one of its verification oracle queries C′‖σ′ is such that it was not
returned by the encryption oracle (i.e. it’s new), and its decryption does not return ⊥. This
gives rise to two cases. The first case is when C′ is new (σ′ may or may not be new in this
case). In this case, M′e ← DKe(C
′) must be new, because C′ is new, and SE is deterministic.





′) is a valid new message-tag pair. Hence
F’s verification oracle will return 1.
The second case is when only σ′ is new and C′ is old. However, we show that in this
case σ′ is invalid, and therefore decryption of C′ will return ⊥. For the same reasons as
explained above, old C′ implies that M′t is old, i.e. M
′
t is one of the messages which was
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queried to the tagging oracle. But then σ′ is an invalid tag, as the corresponding valid and
distinct tag was returned as the answer to the corresponding query.
Hence, the uf-cma advantage of F is the same as the int-ctxt advantage of I. The time
complexity of F is basically that of I. F makes the same number of oracle queries as that
of I. The total length of all the queries made by F exceeds that of I by only a fixed number
of bits, which is the number of queries times (2n − 1), due to the use of encoding (at most
(n − 1) bits for padding, and n bits for confounder).
Before we analyze the IND-CCA security of SE′, let us claim its IND-CPA security.
IND-CPA security. Theorem 7.1 from [15] states that an encryption scheme composed
via the Encode-then-Encrypt&MAC paradigm is IND-CPA if the base encoding scheme
is Coll-CPA, the base MAC scheme is PRF, and the base encryption scheme is IND-CPA.
However, we cannot use it directly, because the base encryption scheme in Construction 3.2.2
is CBC with fixed IV, which is obviously not IND-CPA. We present a modification of Theo-
rem 7.1 from [15] to claim the IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme in Construction 3.2.2,
but before that we present the following construction and its security analysis:
Construction 3.2.4. Let SE = (Ke,E,D) be the CBC encryption scheme with IV = 0n,
and EC = (Encode,Decode) be the encoding scheme of Construction 3.2.2. Then, SE′′ =
(Ke,E′′,D′′) is defined as follows.
• E′′ on inputs Ke and M first gets the encodings via (Me,Mt)
$
← Encode(M). It
then computes C ← EKe(Me), parses Me as con f ‖M, where |con f | = n, and returns
con f ‖C.
• D′′ on inputs Ke and con f ‖C computes Me ← DKe(C), decodes (M,Mt)← Decode(Me),
and returns M.
Claim 3.2.5. The scheme SE′′ defined in Construction 3.2.4 is as secure as the CBC en-
cryption scheme with random IV, CBC$ = (Ke,E$,D$). More precisely, for any adversary
A attacking IND-CPA security of SE′′, that runs in time t, and makes q queries to the
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left-right encryption oracle, totaling µ bits, there exists an adversary D attacking IND-CPA
security of CBC$, such that
Advind-cpa
SE′′
(A) ≤ Advind-cpaCBC$ (D) .
Furthermore, D runs in time t and makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, total-
ing at most (µ + q · (2n − 1)) bits.
Proof of Claim 3.2.5. The proof follows from a similar observation (as in the proof of
Claim 3.1.7) that the random confounder prepended to the message by the encoding scheme
acts as a “pseudorandom” IV in the encryption, because the underlying blockcipher is
assumed to be a PRF.
We construct an adversary D, breaking the IND-CPA security of CBC$, using adversary
A.
For every message-pair query (M,N) that A makes, D first computes (Me,Mt)
$
←
Encode(M), parses Me as con f ‖M, where |con f | = n, pads N to multiple block lengths,
and computes Ne ← con f ‖N. Then it queries (Me,Ne) to its own oracle and gets back
IV‖C, where IV is the first ciphertext block. D forwards (con f ⊕ IV)‖C back to A. When
A halts and returns a bit, D halts and outputs that bit.
We analyze D. We claim that if D is in Expind-cpa-bCBC$ (D) for b ∈ {0, 1}, then A’s view





(A) ≤ Advind-cpaCBC$ (D).
The time complexity of D is basically that of A. D makes the same number of oracle
queries as that of A. The total length of all the queries made by D exceeds that of A by
only a fixed number of bits, which is the number of queries times (2n − 1), due to the use
of encoding (at most (n − 1) bits for padding, and n bits for confounder) 
From Claim 3.2.5 and Claim 3.1.8, we conclude the following.
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Claim 3.2.6. The scheme SE′′ defined in Construction 3.2.4 is IND-CPA secure if the
underlying blockcipher E is a PRF. More precisely, for any adversary A attacking IND-
CPA security of SE′′, that runs in time t and makes q queries to the left-right encryption
oracle, totaling µ bits, there exists an adversary B attacking PRF security of E, such that
Advind-cpa
SE′′




Furthermore, B runs in time t and makes at most b(µ + q · (2n − 1)/n)c oracle queries, to-
taling at most µ + q · (2n − 1) bits.
The following theorem (which is a modification of Theorem 7.1 from [15]) states
that the encryption scheme of Construction 3.2.2 is IND-CPA, if the underlying encod-
ing scheme is Coll-CPA, the underlying MAC scheme is PRF, and the encryption scheme
of Construction 3.2.4 is IND-CPA.
Theorem 3.2.7. Let SE = (Ke,E,D), MAC = (Kt,T ), and EC = (Encode,Decode) be
an encryption scheme, a MAC, and an encoding scheme, respectively, such that the outputs
of the encoding scheme are compatible with the inputs to E,T . Let SE′ and SE′′ be the
associated encryption schemes as per Construction 3.2.2 and Construction 3.2.4, respec-
tively. For any adversary S attacking IND-CPA security of SE′, that runs in time t and
makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, totaling µ bits, there exist adversaries A
attacking IND-CPA security of SE′′, G attacking PRF security ofMAC, and C attacking
Coll-CPA security of EC, such that
Advind-cpa
SE′
(S ) ≤ Advind-cpa
SE′′
(A) + 2 · Advprf
MAC
(G) + 2 · Advcoll-cpa
EC
(C) (7)
Furthermore, A and C use the same resources as S , while G runs in time t and makes q
oracle queries, totaling at most (µ + q · (2n − 1)) bits.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.7. The proof is very similar to the Proof of Theorem 7.1 of [15].
Let S be an adversary attacking IND-CPA security of SE′. For x ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we define the















Case x = 1: C ← EKe(Me,1), σ← TKt(Mt,1)
Case x = 2: C ← EKe(Me,0), σ← TKt(Mt,1)
Case x = 3: C ← EKe(Me,0), σ← TKt(Mt,0)
Return C‖σ to S .
Until S halts and returns a bit b.
Return b.




denote the probability that experiment ExpHx
returns 1. By the definition of Advind-cpa
SE′
(S ), we have
Advind-cpa
SE′
(S ) = P1 − P3 = (P1 − P2) + (P2 − P3) (8)
Given S , there exist adversaries A,G and C, such that the following lemmas hold, and these
adversaries use the resources specified in Theorem 3.2.7.
Lemma 3.2.8. P1 − P2 ≤ Advind-cpaSE′′ (A) .




Eq. (8), and the above lemmas imply Theorem 3.2.7. 
Proof of Lemma 3.2.8. We construct an adversary A attacking IND-CPA security of SE′′,
using the adversary S . A first runs Kt to obtain a key Kt. For every message-pair query
(M0,M1) that S makes, A uses that message-pair to query to its own oracle and gets back
con f ‖C. Now, it pads M1 to multiple block length and computes Mt,1 ← con f ‖M1, σ ←
TKt(Mt,1). It then gives C‖σ to S . When S halts and returns a bit b
′, A halts and returns b′.
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If b = 1, the adversary A simulates S in the exact same environment as that of ExpH1.
Similarly, if b = 0, the adversary A simulates S in the exact same environment as that of
ExpH2. Thus,















Adversary A uses the same resources as S . 
Proof of Lemma 3.2.9. The proof follows directly from Lemma 7.7 and Theorem 7.4 of
[15]. 
Below we claim that the encoding scheme EC in the Simplified profile is Coll-CPA.







Proof of Claim 3.2.10. To justify the claim, we note that Encode algorithm prepends a
random n-bit confounder to the message, and the only chance that the adversary can make
any two encodings Mt,M′t collide is if any two of q confounders happen to be the same.
This can happen with probability at most q(q−1)2n+1 , by the well-known birthday bound. 
Theorem 3.2.7, Claim 3.2.6, and Claim 3.2.10 imply the following.
Claim 3.2.11. The authenticated encryption scheme SE′ described by the Simplified pro-
file (Construction 3.2.2) is IND-CPA secure, if the underlying blockcipher E is a PRF, and
the underlying MAC is a PRF.
Concretely, for any adversary S attacking IND-CPA security of SE′, that runs in time t, and
makes q queries to the left-right encryption oracle, totaling µ bits, there exist adversaries B
and G attacking PRF security of E andMAC, respectively, such that
Advind-cpa
SE′











Furthermore, B runs in time t and makes at most b(µ + q · (2n − 1)/n)c oracle queries, to-
taling at most µ + q · (2n − 1) bits; G runs in time t and makes q oracle queries, totaling at
most µ + q · (2n − 1) bits.




RANDOMNESS GENERATION IN KERBEROS
In this chapter, we present our hash-function-based pseudorandom generator, whose output
can be used in place of random strings, e.g., session keys, sequence numbers, confounders,
etc. are all suggested to be generated randomly in Kerberos specifications. In Section 4.1,
we recall a general design technique used in several prior works that we call PRG from
Iterates. This is followed by our construction in Section 4.2, and its proof of security in
Section 4.3. Finally, we discuss some improvements in our assumptions and efficiency in
Section 4.4 and Section 4.5, respectively.
4.1 PRG from Iterates
Most of the pseudorandom generators (PRGs) that we know today employ a general design
technique: take a function that remains one-way on iterates, and iterate that function for
a desired number of times, extracting hardcore bits at every iteration. Below we give a
general theorem for the security of such PRGs. The theorem already exists in some form
in the cryptographic literature (or, is implied from results in several papers, [67, 48, 55], to
name a few), but we restate it and sketch its proof here for two main reasons. One is that the
proof has evolved over time, starting from Levin’s work [67], followed by a proof sketch
by Goldreich et al. (cf. Appendix B in [48]), and the improved construction of hard-core
predicate by Goldreich and Levin [49]. The second reason is that none of the prior works
state the result in its entirety with a concrete security statement.
We will start with a more general definition that also captures the definition of pseudo-
randomness presented in Section 2.6. Let X and Y be random variables with equal output
lengths. Let D be an adversary for distinguishing X from Y. The indistinguishability
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advantage of D, Advind












← Y : D(y) = 1
]
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U|G| is a uniform distribution of size equal to the output size of G. The following theorem
states the security of a PRG constructed from a function that is one-way on iterates, using
the well known Goldreich-Levin hardcore bits.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let f : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n be any function, and for any i ∈ N, let f i denote
its ith iterate, defined arbitrarily but satisfying the following condition: given only f i(x) for
any x ∈ {0, 1}m, f i+1(x) should be efficiently computable. For any k ∈ N, if f k is one-way
on iterates1, then for random x, r ∈ {0, 1}m, the random variables








‖r‖ f k(x) and Y = Uk‖r‖ f k(x)
are indistinguishable, where Uk is a uniform distribution of k bits. More formally, for an
adversary D with running time tD, there exists an adversary I with running time tI , so that
Advind





Advhtcf i, f (I)
)
, and tI = O
(















dom, given r and f k(x).
Proof Sketch of Theorem 4.1.1. Any adversary trying to distinguish








‖r‖ f k(x) from Y = Uk‖r‖ f k(x) ,
can distinguish them only from the first k bits, because the remaining portion ofX andY are
the same. The proof is presented in three parts. In the first part, we show that the indistin-




‖ . . . ‖
1 f k is one-way on iterates, if given f k(x) for a random x ∈ {0, 1}m, it is hard to compute x′ ∈ {0, 1}m such





‖ 〈x, r〉 (without loss of generality, the output of X is written in reverse order).
Yao [91] showed using hybrid argument that a sequence is indistinguishable from random,
if and only if, it is hard to predict the next bit of the sequence, for every prefix of the se-
quence. Using this result, for an adversary D with running time tD, there exist an adversary





‖ . . . ‖〈
f i(x), r
〉























, and tU ≈ tD,
where f 0(x) = x.
In the second part, we show that given the adversary U with running time tU , there
































, and tA ≈ tU .
A is easy to construct. We know from the theorem that f i+1(x), . . . , f k(x) are efficiently






Finally, using Theorem 2.5.9, given the adversary A with running time tA, one can con-
struct an adversary I with running time tI that can compute f i−1(x), given f i(x), so that





, and tI = O
(


















, and tI = O
(







4.2 Our PRG Construction
We first define the subset iterate, a particular way to iterate a hash function on a subset of
the actual domain. We use this in our PRG construction.
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Subset Iterate. Let H be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from
{0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. For any i ∈ N and any h ∈ H , we define the ith subset iterate of h, hi, and
denote the corresponding family byH i. For x ∈ {0, 1}n, hi is defined recursively as





∀i > 1 .
Any unambiguous padding (in place of zeroes, above) can be used to make the input to h
of size m bits. For any i ∈ N, we define the one-way on iterates or owi advantage of an







← H , x
$










We now present our PRG construction. It requires a very short seed (twice the output size
of the hash function).
Construction 4.2.1. LetH be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from
{0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. For any l > 2n, a random h ∈ H , which we assume becomes publicly
known, and a random seed s ∈ {0, 1}2n, the pseudorandom generator G parses the input s as










where for two bitstrings x (= x1‖ . . . ‖xn) and r (= r1‖ . . . ‖rn), 〈x, r〉 =
∑n
i=1 xi · ri (mod 2)
is their inner product modulo 2.
Note that the seed length of G is 2n, and it is independent of the output length l. We
now present the security analysis of the above construction.
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4.2.2 Security
For simplicity, in the following theorem we assume that the underlying hash function
family is regular. We will show how to relax this assumption to worst-case regularity in
Section 4.4.
Theorem 4.2.2. Let H be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a regular function
from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n and takes time tH in computation. For any l > 2n, let G be the
associated PRG, as defined by Construction 4.2.1. Then for an adversary P attacking the
pseudorandomness of G with running time tP, there exists an adversary C attacking the
collision-resistance ofH with running time tC, and q = btC/tHc, so that
Advprg
G
(P) ≤ 24 · (l − n) ·


















, 2(l − n)tH
}
.
Remark. The above theorem gives a relation between the pseudorandomness of G and the
collision-resistance of its underlying hash function H . The advantage equation provides
meaningful security guarantees only if Advcr
H
(C) < 2−n/2. Also, as pointed out in the proof






could be replaced with Advtcr
H
(C1) · AdvcrH (C2) for C1,C2 attacking the target collision-
resistance and collision-resistance of H , respectively), though the expression would be-
come even more complicated. We present the proof in Section 4.3.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2.2
We start with a short overview of the proof. The proof consists of two main parts: first
we prove that the subset iterate used in the construction of our PRG is one-way on iterates
(Theorem 4.3.1), and then we use the general result of Levin [67] (Theorem 4.1.1) to show
that our PRG is secure.
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The subset iterate is constructed using a hash function. Now, suppose that we have an
algorithm I that can invert the subset iterate, i.e. given (h, hi(x)) for any i ≥ 2, random h,
and random x, it returns x′ such that h(x′‖0m−n) = hi(x). Then, we can use I to break the
target collision-resistance (TCR) of the underlying hash function. The challenge for the
TCR attack (h, x) is used to compute h(x), and then (h, h(x)) given to I, and assuming that
h(x) ∈ Im(hi), with a very high probability the output of I, x′ (and x) is a collision instance
for h. These steps are similar to those in the proof from [55].
Now, the main challenge is to show that with a non-negligible probability h(x) ∈ Im(hi)
(Lemma 4.3.4). The proof of the above is the crux and the main novelty of our analysis.
We basically show that on iteration, the image set of the subset iterate shrinks by only a
polynomial fraction, i.e., for any i ≥ 2, |Im(hi)|/|Im(hi−1)| is a polynomial fraction. For this
we rely on Lemma 4.3.2, which says that the collision probability (in the birthday attack)
of a subset iterate degrades only by a multiplicative factor of the square of the number of
iterations. It may not be obvious, but the size of the image set and the collision probability
of any function are closely related, which is precisely the reason why we are able to prove
Lemma 4.3.2.
Before we provide the full security proof, we present some justification for our ap-
proach. One could argue that it is better to directly assume that the underlying CRHF is
one-way on iterates (OWI), and be done with it. We don’t take this approach for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, the OWI property appears to be hard to test in practice. Unlike
collision-resistance, we do not know of any experiment carried out by practitioners to mea-
sure the strength of a function against this kind of attack. Second, we do not know how
does OWI security degrade with the number of iterations, which may be crucial in finding
out exactly how many bits can be generated securely by any PRG.
In order to prove Theorem 4.2.2, we state the following theorem about the OWI secu-
rity of the subset iterate used in the construction of our PRG. This theorem together with
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Theorem 4.1.1 (by substituting (l − n) for k) will imply Theorem 4.2.2. (One might no-
tice some inconsistencies between Theorem 4.3.1 and Theorem 4.1.1 in the sense that the
underlying primitive in the former is a function family, while it is only a function in the lat-
ter. We note, however, that Theorem 4.1.1 is applicable without any change in the security
reduction to our PRG construction from a hash function family.)
Theorem 4.3.1. Let H be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a regular function
from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n and takes time tH in computation. For any i ∈ N, let H i be the
associated ith subset iterate function family of H , as defined in Section 4.2. Then for an
adversary I with running time tI , there exists an adversary C with running time tC, and
q = btC/tHc, so that
Advowi
H i








)2 13 , and tC = max {tI , 2itH } .
Proof of Theorem 4.3.1. We construct an adversary C1 with running time tC1 = tI , for
attacking the target collision-resistance of H . C1 is given a random h ∈ H and a random
x ∈ {0, 1}m. It runs the adversary I attacking one-wayness on iterates of H i with input
(h, h(x)). Let x′ be the output of I. If x , x′‖0m−n and h(x) = h(x′‖0m−n), it returns x′‖0m−n.
We state the following three lemmas from which we will derive the inequality of
Theorem 4.3.1. Lemma 4.3.2 gives an upper bound on the collison probability of birth-
day attack on the subset iterate of a hash function family. Lemma 4.3.3 which is similar
to Claim 3.3 of [55], states that the set of inputs on which the adversary I succeeds rea-
sonably well (better than one third of its advantage) is not small (at least two thirds of its
advantage) in size. And, Lemma 4.3.4 which is similar to Lemma 3.4 of [55], states that
the set of inputs that I should get in the actual experiment (hi(x) for a random x ∈ {0, 1}n)
and the set of inputs that it actually gets in the above experiment simulated by C1 (h(x) for
a random x ∈ {0, 1}m), overlap for the most part.
Lemma 4.3.2. Let H be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from
{0, 1}m to {0, 1}n and takes time tH in computation. For any i ∈ N, let H i be the associated
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ith subset iterate of H , as defined in Section 4.2. Then for any q ≥ 2i, there exists an
adversary C2 that runs in time (at most) q · tH , such that







Proof of Lemma 4.3.2. We know that for any function f with output size n bits and bal-
ance measure µ( f ), (upto constant factors) the collision probability for any t ∈ N trials,





· 2−nµ( f ), see [14] for details. Let q′ = bq/i − 2c, then





Also, it is immediate that there exists an adversary C′ running in time equivalent to q′
computations of hi ∈ H i, such that
Advcr
H i
(C′) ≥ CP(H i, q′) .
(In the worst case, C′ could simply run the birthday attack with q′ trials.)
Now, given C′ we will construct the adversary C2 (from the lemma) that runs in time at
most q · tH , so that
Advcr
H
(C2) = AdvcrH i(C
′) .
Note that for any hi ∈ H i, and any x , x′ ∈ {0, 1}n, if hi(x) = hi(x′), then there exists
j < i, such that h j(x) , h j(x′) and h j+1(x) = h j+1(x′). When C′ returns (x, x′), C2 computes
y ← h j(x), y′ ← h j(x′), and returns (y‖0m−n, y′‖0m−n). Recall that y , y′ and h(y‖0m−n) =
h(y′‖0m−n), so the advantage of C2 is the same as that of C′. Assuming that one computation
of hi ∈ H i requires the same time as i computations of h ∈ H , we have that the running
time of C2 is at most q · tH (≥ (i · q′ + 2i) · tH ), because apart from running C′ (which is
equivalent to i · q′ computations of h ∈ H), C2 does 2 j (< 2i) computations of h ∈ H to
compute its own output. Thus, Advcr
H
(C2) is equal to
Advcr
H i











from which the lemma follows. 
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Lemma 4.3.3. Let H be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from
{0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. For any i ∈ N and any h ∈ H , let hi be the associated ith subset iterate and
H i be the corresponding family, as defined in Section 4.2. For any adversary I, consider the
following probabilities in an experiment where a random h ∈ H and a random x ∈ {0, 1}n
are picked, and a set S ⊆ Im(hi) is defined as
S =
{
y ∈ Im(hi) : Pr
[





















Proof of Lemma 4.3.3. Assume (for contradiction) that in the above experiment, where a
random h ∈ H and a random x ∈ {0, 1}n are picked, and a set S ⊆ Im(hi) is defined as







































where the probabilities are over randomly picked h ∈ H and x ∈ {0, 1}n.
S is the set of points where the adversary’s advantage is greater than one-third of its
actual (or, average) advantage. So, setting the adversary’s advantage to be 1 for points in-
side S and one-third for points outside S , we get the first inequality. The second inequality





(I), which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 4.3.4. Let H be a hash function family, where each h ∈ H is a mapping from
{0, 1}m to {0, 1}n. For any i ∈ N and any h ∈ H , let hi be the associated ith subset iterate
and H i be the corresponding family, as defined in Section 4.2. Consider the following
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probabilities in an experiment where a random h ∈ H and a random x ∈ {0, 1}n are picked.







Pr [ h(x) ∈ T ] ≥
δ2
2n+1 · CP(hi, 2)
.
Proof of Lemma 4.3.4. We will first compute a lower bound on the collision probability
of hi for two trials, CP(hi, 2). Pick two elements x1, x2 uniformly at random from {0, 1}n,
and then compute the probability that both hi(x1), hi(x2) are equal and belong to the set T .
This probability is clearly a lower bound on CP(hi, 2), because T is a subset of Im(hi). The
probability that both hi(x1), hi(x2) ∈ T is at least δ2, and given that hi(x1), hi(x2) ∈ T , the
probability that hi(x1) = hi(x2) is at least 1/|T |. The reason is that even though x1, x2 are
uniformly random elements in {0, 1}n, hi(x1), hi(x2) may not2 be uniformly random elements
in T . So, the probability that hi(x1) = hi(x2) can be lower bounded by computing the
probability of getting the same element, when two elements are picked (with replacement)
uniformly at random from the set T . By simple probability theory, the probability of such
an event is 1/|T |. It may however be noted that in the above calculation, we are also
counting trivial collisions, i.e. when x1 = x2. To compensate for this, we subtract 2−n from








From Eq. (9), we have
|T | ≥
δ2
CP(hi, 2) + 2−n
≥
δ2
2 · CP(hi, 2)
,
because CP(hi, 2) ≥ 2−n.
2These elements are uniformly distributed, only if hi is a regular function.
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For any h ∈ H , Im(hi) ⊆ Im(h), and since T ⊆ Im(hi), we have that T ⊆ Im(h). Also,





← H , x
$









Thus, the statement of the lemma follows. 
Implication of Lemma 4.3.2, Lemma 4.3.3, and Lemma 4.3.4. Substituting S for T and 23 ·
Advowi
H i
(I) (from Lemma 4.3.3) for δ in Lemma 4.3.4, we get that for a random h ∈ H ,





← H , x
$




















2n+1 · CP(hi, 2)
.
The above equation is a lower bound on the probability that for a random h ∈ H and a
random x ∈ {0, 1}m, I’s challenge, h(x) belongs to the subset S . From the description of C1,







← H , x
$
← {0, 1}m, x′
$








← H , x
$
← {0, 1}m, x′
$






← H , x
$
← {0, 1}m, x′
$
← I(h, h(x)) : h(x′‖0m−n) = h(x)
]
.
Let us denote the two probabilities in the last equation by P1 and P2, respectively. So,
Advtcr
H














because x is a uniformly random m-bit string, so the probability that the last m − n bits of
x are all 0’s is at most 2n−m. Also, from Lemma 4.3.3, we have that for a random h ∈ H ,
3We note that this is the only point in the proof that relies on the assumption that h is a regular function.
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← H , x
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2n+1 · CP(hi, 2)
.
The second inequality is from the lower bound on the probability that I’s challenge h(x)









33 · 2n · CP(hi, 2)
.
Combining the above inequality with Lemma 4.3.2, we have that for any q ≥ 2i, there
exists an adversary C2 that runs in time (at most) q · tH , such that
Advtcr
H













Recall that the running time of C1, tC1 = tI . Let q = max{btI/tHc, 2i}, and let C denote
the adversary (among C1,C2) with higher collision-resistance advantage, i.e., C = C1
if Advcr
H
(C1) ≥ AdvcrH (C2), otherwise C = C2. (Note that we are getting rid of target
collision-resistance advantage for a simpler theorem statement, albeit at a loss in the secu-


















The running time of C, tC = max{tI , 2itH }, and hence, Theorem 4.3.1 follows. 
4.4 Relaxing the Regularity Assumption
We introduce a new notion that we call worst-case regularity. It captures the lower bound
on the size of the smallest set of preimages of elements from the range of a function. The
notion appears somewhat similar to the notions of “weakly regular” introduced by Goldre-
ich et al. [48] and “balance measure” introduced by Bellare and Kohno [14]. However, the
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reason for introducing a new notion (instead of working with the previous ones), is that it
seems unlikely that one can find a tight relation between worst-case regularity and balance
measure (or, weak regularity), and thus a tight bound for our theorem, for any general func-
tion (or, a CRHF in particular). The intuition behind this is that while worst-case regularity
measures the lower bound on the size of preimages, the other two notions are related to the
average of these sizes. We will first present the formal definition of worst-case regularity,
and then adjust the statement of our main theorem for the case when the underlying CRHF
is not necessarily regular.
Worst-case Regularity. Let F be a family of functions, where each f ∈ F is a mapping
from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n, and let α ∈ (0, 1]. We say that F is α-worst-case regular, if for all
f ∈ F and all y ∈ Im( f )
|Preim( f , y)| ≥ α · 2m−n .
For a completely regular function family, α = 1.
As pointed out before, the only place where the regularity assumption is required for
our proof is in Eq. (10) of Lemma 4.3.4. So, we will first modify this equation and give
justification for this modification, and then adjust our main theorem accordingly. For a
not-necessarily regular function family Eq. (10) changes as follows.





← H , x
$
← {0, 1}m : h(x) ∈ T
]
≥
α · |T |
2n
, (11)
where H is a hash function family as defined in Lemma 4.3.4. Since H is α-worst-case
regular, the lower bound on the total size of the preimages of elements in T is (α ·2m−n · |T |).
So, when an element is picked uniformly at random from a set of size 2m, the probability
that it hits a subset of size (α · 2m−n · |T |) is α·|T |2n .
Taking the above equation into account, we present the modified main theorem.
Theorem 4.4.1. [Modified Theorem 4.2.2] Let H be an α-worst-case regular hash func-
tion family, where each h ∈ H is a function from {0, 1}m to {0, 1}n and takes time tH in
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computation. For any l > 2n, let G be the associated pseudorandom generator, as defined
by Construction 4.2.1. Then for an adversary P with running time tP, there exists an adver-
sary C with running time tC, and q = btC/tHc, so that
Advprg
G
(P) ≤ 24 · (l − n) ·
(bq/(l − n) − 2c2
)−1




















Instead of extracting just one hardcore bit in an iteration, we can extract upto a constant
factor of n hardcore bits, depending on the one-way on iterates security (and hence, the
collision-resistance, see Theorem 4.3.1) of the underlying hash function. For the ith iter-






denote the one-way on iterates security of H i, where the
maximum is over all polynomial-time adversary I. Then, one can extract ki = O(log εi)
hardcore bits in the ith iteration without compromising the security of the PRG (cf. Theo-
rem 2.5.6 in [46]). The way to do it is to pick a random r (used with the iterated function’s
output in the inner product computation) of size (n+ki−1) bits, and return 〈·, r1〉‖ . . . ‖〈·, rk〉,
where “·” is the output of the function in a particular iteration, and for j ∈ [k], r j is the first
n bits of r starting from the jth bit. Recall that the same r can be used in all the iterations,
so a sufficiently large r (< 2n bits) can be picked in the beginning and used throughout.
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CHAPTER V
REVOCATION IN NEWER TYPES OF ENCRYPTION
In this chapter, we present our third and final set of results concerning efficient revocation
in IBEs and ABEs. Due to the attractive features provided by these new cryptographic
primitives, they have been used in many practical protocols. We present our definitions in
Section 5.1, and constructions and their proofs of security in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3,
we discuss ways to make our construction secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Finally,
in Section 5.4, we briefly discuss how to extend our techniques from IBE to ABE.
5.1 Revocable IBE and its Security
We start with defining the general syntax of a Revocable IBE scheme.
5.1.1 Syntax of Revocable IBE
Definition 5.1.1. [Revocable IBE] An identity-based encryption with efficient revocation
or simply Revocable IBE scheme RIBE = (S,SK ,KU,DK ,E,D,R) is defined by seven
algorithms and has an associated message space MsgSp, an identity space IdSp and a time
space TimeSp. We assume that the size of TimeSp is polynomial in the security parameter
κ. Each algorithm is run by either one of the three types of parties - key authority, sender
or receiver. Key authority maintains a revocation list rl and a state st. The revocation list
rl can be part of the state st, but we keep it explicit for clarity. In what follows, we call
an algorithm stateful only if it updates rl or st. We treat time as discrete as opposed to
continuous.
• The stateful setup algorithm S (run by key authority) takes input the security param-
eter 1κ and the number of users n, and outputs a public parameters pk, a master key
mk, a revocation list rl (initially empty) and a state st.
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• The stateful private key generation algorithm SK (run by key authority) takes input
the public parameters pk, the master key mk, an identity ω ∈ IdSp and the state st,
and outputs a private key skω and an updated state st.
• The key update generation algorithmKU (run by key authority) takes input the pub-
lic parameters pk, the master key mk, a key update time t ∈ TimeSp, the revocation
list rl and the state st, and outputs a key update kut.
• The deterministic decryption key generation algorithm DK (run by receiver) takes
input a private key skω and a key update kut, and outputs a decryption key dkω,t, or a
special symbol ⊥ indicating that ω was revoked.
(We say an identity ω was revoked at time t, if the revocation algorithm R was run
by key authority on input (ω, t, rl, st) for any rl, st.)
• The encryption algorithm E (run by sender) takes input the public parameters pk,
an identity ω ∈ IdSp, an encryption time t ∈ TimeSp and a message m ∈ MsgSp,
and outputs a ciphertext c. For simplicity and w.l.o.g., we assume that the encryption
time and identity are efficiently computable from c.
• The deterministic decryption algorithmD (run by receiver) takes input a decryption
key dkω,t and a ciphertext c, and outputs a message m ∈ MsgSp, or a special symbol
⊥ indicating that the ciphertext is invalid.
• The stateful revocation algorithm R (run by key authority) takes input an identity to
be revoked ω ∈ IdSp, a revocation time t ∈ TimeSp, the revocation list rl and the
state st, and outputs an updated revocation list rl.
The consistency condition requires that for all κ ∈ N and polynomials (in κ) n, all pk and
mk output by setup algorithm S, all m ∈ MsgSp, ω ∈ IdSp, t ∈ TimeSp and all possible
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valid1 states st and revocation lists rl; if identity ω was not revoked before, or at time t then
the following experiment returns 1 with probability 1:
(skω, st)
$
← SK(pk,mk, ω, st) ; kut
$
← KU(pk,mk, t, rl, st)
dkω,t ← DK(skω, kut) ; c
$
← E(pk, ω, t,m)
IfD(dkω,t, c) = m then return 1 else return 0.
Remarks. Note that we differentiate between the terms “private key” and “decryption key”.
One can also define the decryption key generation algorithm that instead of private key skω,
takes input the decryption key for the previous time period dkω,t−1. We do not discuss this
version as it is not used in our construction.
5.1.2 Security of Revocable IBE
We define the selective-revocable-ID security for Revocable IBE schemes. Our security
model captures the standard notion of selective-ID security, but it also takes into account
possible revocations. Since we explicitly consider time periods, in the beginning of the
experiment, in addition to the challenge identity the adversary also declares the challenge
time. Just as in the standard slective-ID security definition, the adversary can request to
learn users’ keys. In addition, we let the adversary to revoke users of its choice (including
the challenge identity) at any period of time, and see all key updates, which are the decryp-
tion key components corresponding to time and are published by key authority for every
time period. Unlike in the standard security model, we allow the adversary to learn the
private key for the challenge identity, but only if it was revoked prior to, or, at the challenge
time. The adversary is given a ciphertext of one of the two messages of its choice, en-
crypted for the challenge identity and time. It has to guess which one of the two messages
was encrypted.
1A valid state is the one that is output by either setup algorithm S or private key generation algorithm
SK . A valid revocation list is the one that is output by either S or R.
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First we define (selective) security against chosen-plaintext attack, and then show how
to extend the definition to chosen-ciphertext attack.
Definition 5.1.2. [sRID Security] Let RIBE = (S, SK , KU,DK ,E,D,R) be a Revo-
cable IBE scheme. The adversary first outputs the challenge identity and time, and also
some information state it wants to preserve. Later it is given access to three oracles that
correspond to the algorithms of the scheme. The oracles share state.2 Since we use the
simplified notation for the oracles, we define them now:
• The private key generation oracleSK(·) takes input an identityω, and runsSK(pk,mk, ω, st)
to return private key skω.
• The key update generation oracleKU(·) takes input a time t, and runsKU(pk,mk, t, rl, st)
to return key update kut.
• The revocation oracleR(·, ·) takes input an identityω and a time t, and runsR(ω, t, rl, st)
to update rl.

















← E(pk, ω∗, t∗,mb)
d
$
← ASK(·),KU(·),R(·,·)(pk, c∗, state)
If b = d return 1 else return 0.
The following conditions must always hold:
2To be more formal, we could define a single oracle that maintains the state and invokes these oracles as
subroutines. We do not do it for simplicity.
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1. m0,m1 ∈ MsgSp and |m0| = |m1|.
2. KU(·) and R(·, ·) can be queried on a time that is greater than or equal to the time
of all previous queries, i.e., the adversary is allowed to query only in non-decreasing
order of time3. Also, R(·, ·) cannot be queried on time t, if KU(·) was queried on t.4
3. If SK(·) was queried on an identity ω∗, then R(·, ·) must be queried on (ω∗, t) for
some t ≤ t∗.
We define the advantage of A, Advsrid−cpa
RIBE,n (A) as
Advsrid−cpa
RIBE,n (A) = 2 · Pr
[
Expsrid−cpa
RIBE,n (A) = 1
]
− 1 .
The scheme RIBE is said to be sRID-CPA secure, if Advsrid−cpa
RIBE,n (A) is negligible in κ
for any efficient A and polynomial n.
Chosen-ciphertext attack. We extend the above definition in a standard way to take into
account chosen-ciphertext attacks. Whenever the adversary is given the oracles, it is also
given a decryption oracleD(·) that takes input a ciphertext c, and runsD(dkω∗,t, c) to return
message m or ⊥. The usual restriction is that D(·) cannot be queried on challenge cipher-
text c∗. The advantage of the adversary Advsrid−cca
RIBE,n(A) and sRID-CCA security are defined
analogously to the CPA setting.
5.2 Our Main Construction
Intuition. At a high level, we build on the (large universe) construction of Fuzzy IBE [83]
and the binary tree data structure. We briefly recall the Fuzzy IBE primitive ideas and the
basics of the construction.
In the Fuzzy IBE construction from [83], users’ keys and ciphertexts are associated
with sets of descriptive attributes. A user’s key can decrypt a particular ciphertext only if
3This is w.l.o.g., because the adversary can query the oracles for all possible time periods one by one.
4This is because we assume that the key update is done at the end of the time period t.
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some number of attributes (so called “error-tolerance”) match between the ciphertext and
the key. The number of attributes used to encrypt, and the error-tolerance are fixed during
the setup. Security of Fuzzy IBE requires that different users should not be able to pool
their attributes together and be able to decrypt a ciphertext which none of them were able
to decrypt individually. To prevent collusions, the key generation algorithm of Fuzzy IBE
generates a random polynomial (of degree one less than the error-tolerance) for each user.
This polynomial is used to compute keys corresponding to a set of attributes. Since all the
keys are computed on different polynomials, they cannot be combined in any meaningful
way.
In our IBE scheme, messages are encrypted under two “attributes”: identity of the re-
ceiver and the time period. The decryption key is also computed for attributes identity
and time, on a first-degree polynomial, meaning both attributes of the decryption key must
match with those of a ciphertext for decryption to be successful. We split the decryption
key in two components corresponding to identity and time, that we call private key and
key update, respectively. The private key is issued to each user by key authority5 just like
regular private keys in IBE. The key update is published by key authority and is publicly
available to all users. To be able to decrypt a ciphertext, a user needs both the private key
and the key update. Thus, when key authority needs to revoke a user it may simply stop
publishing key updates for that user. As we recalled above, in Fuzzy IBE the polynomial of
a decryption key is selected at random to prevent collusion between different keys. Using
Fuzzy IBE in a naive way would thus require computing key updates for each user sepa-
rately. We use a different approach to reduce the number of key updates that key authority
needs to compute. We use a binary tree of height h (with at least as many leaves as the
number of users in the system) and assign a random polynomial to each node of the tree.
Next we associate each user to a unique leaf node. Every user gets keys (corresponding to
5We use a different name than PKG to emphasize a new way to handle revocations.
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its identity) computed on polynomials of all nodes on the path from the leaf node corre-
sponding to that user to the root node. To be able to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with
time t, a user just needs one key update (corresponding to t) computed on any one of the
polynomials of nodes on the path from the leaf node of the user to the root node. Thus,
when no user is revoked, key authority just needs to publish a key update computed on the
polynomial of the root node. When a subset of the users is revoked, key authority first finds
the minimal set of nodes in the tree which contains an ancestor (or, the node itself) among
all the leaf nodes corresponding to non-revoked users. Then, it publishes key updates on
polynomials of the nodes in this set. We first address chosen-plaintext attack only, and later
show how to extend the scheme to resist chosen-ciphertext attacks, as well.
Construction. We now specify the scheme RIBE[G] = (S,SK ,KU,DK ,E,D,R),
where G is the bilinear group generator. We assume that all users agree on how time is di-
vided by time periods, and how each time period is specified, e.g., by days and “04.14.08”.
In our RIBE scheme, messages are encrypted using identity and time. Identity is a string
associated with any user, e.g., an email “abc@xyz.com”. Time indicates when the cipher-
text is supposed to be decrypted, e.g., on 04.14.08. The message space MsgSp is GT . The
identity space IdSp is {0, 1}∗, and the time space TimeSp is an arbitrary bitstring set of
size polynomial in the security parameter. We require that the strings specifying identities
and times can be distinguished, e.g., by reserving the most significant bit (MSB): 0 for
identity strings, and 1 for time strings. In our construction, identity and time strings are
mapped to unique elements of Z∗p (if needed, a collision-resistant hash function mapping
{0, 1}∗ to Z∗p can be used). From now on for simplicity, we assume that identity and time
are distinguished elements in Z∗p.












u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
u1 u2 u3 u4 u5
No user is revoked
User u3 is revoked
Nodes for key updates output by KUNodes
Nodes marked as revoked by KUNodes
Figure 4: Pictorial Description of KUNodes Function











Our construction uses the binary tree data structure, so we introduce some notation
now. We denote by root, the root node. If v is a leaf node, then Path(v) denotes the set of
nodes on the path from v to root (both v and root inclusive). If v is a non-leaf node, then
vl, vr denote the left and the right child of v. We assume that nodes in the tree are uniquely
encoded as strings, and the tree is defined by all of its nodes descriptions.
We also define a function KUNodes that is used to compute the minimal set of nodes
for which key update needs to be published, so that only non-revoked users at time t are
able to decrypt ciphertexts.6 The function takes input a binary tree T, a revocation list rl
6A similar function was used in [2].
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and a time t, and outputs a set of nodes, which is the minimal set of nodes in T, such that
none of the nodes in rl with corresponding time ≤ t (users revoked on or before t) have
any ancestor (or, themselves) in the set, and all other leaf nodes (corresponding to non-
revoked users) have exactly one ancestor (or, themselves) in the set. The function operates
as follows. First mark all the ancestors of revoked nodes as revoked, then output all the




∀(vi, ti) ∈ rl
if ti ≤ t, then add Path(vi) to X
∀x ∈ X
if xl < X, then add xl to Y
if xr < X, then add xr to Y
if Y = φ, then add root to Y
return Y
We are now ready to present the description of Revocable IBE. We could not use the
algorithms of the Fuzzy IBE construction from [83] in a black-box manner. The reason
is that there the polynomial for each key is picked independently by the key generation
algorithm. And in our construction some polynomials need to be shared by different keys.
After we provide the details for each algorithm, we give some intuition and relation to the
construction from [83] following “//” sign.
Construction 5.2.1. Let G be a prime order bilinear group generator. Let J be the set
{1, 2, 3}.
• Setup S(1κ, n): (G̃, p, g)
$
← G(1κ) ; a
$
← Zp ; g1 ← ga ; g2, h1, h2, h3
$
← G. Let
rl be an empty set, and T be a binary tree with at least n leaf nodes. Return pk =
(g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3) ; mk = a ; rl ; st = T.
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// Besides the additional outputs of rl and st, it is essentially the same as Setup of
Fuzzy IBE, in which 2 out of 2 attributes need to be matched.
• Private Key Generation SK(pk,mk, ω, st): Parse pk as (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3), mk as
a, st as T.7 Pick an unassigned leaf node v from T, and store ω in that node.
∀x ∈ Path(v)
if ax is undefined, then ax
$
← Zp, store ax in node x
rx
$
← Zp ; Dx ← g
axω+a
2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(ω)
rx ; dx ← grx
Return skω = {(x,Dx, dx)}x ∈ Path(v) ; st.
// We note that ax above fixes a first-degree polynomial qx(y) = axy+a corresponding
to node x. The algorithm computes the ω-components of the decryption key using
the polynomials of all the nodes on the path from leaf node corresponding to ω to the
root node.
• Key Update Generation KU(pk,mk, t, rl, st): Parse pk as (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3), mk
as a, st as T.
∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t)
rx
$
← Zp ; Ex ← g
axt+a
2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(t)
rx ; ex ← grx
Return kut = {(x, Ex, ex)}x ∈ KUNodes(T,rl,t).
// The algorithm first finds a minimal set of nodes which contains an ancestor (or, the
node itself) of all the non-revoked nodes. Then it computes the t- component of the
decryption key using the polynomials of all the nodes in that set.
• Decryption Key GenerationDK(skω, kut): Parse skω as {(i,Di, di)}i ∈ I, kut as {( j, E j, e j)} j ∈ J
for some set of nodes I, J.
7Every node x in T stores an element ax ∈ Zp, and in addition, every leaf node stores an identity ω. If no
such identity is stored at a leaf node, we say that the leaf node is unassigned.
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∀(i,Di, di) ∈ skω, ( j, E j, e j) ∈ kut
if ∃(i, j) s.t. i = j, then dkω,t ← (Di, E j, di, e j)
else if skω and kut don’t have any node in common, then dkω,t ← ⊥
Return dkω,t.
// Above we can drop the subscripts i, j since they are equal, i.e., dkω,t = (D, E, d, e).
The algorithm finds components of skω and kut which were computed on the same
polynomial.
• Encryption E(pk, ω, t,m): Parse pk as (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3). z
$
← Zp ; c1 ← m ·
e(g1, g2)z ; c2 ← gz ; cω ← Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(ω)z ; ct ← Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(t)z. Return c =
(ω, t, cω, ct, c1, c2).
// The Encryption algorithm is essentially the same as that of Fuzzy IBE.











ω−t . Return m.
// The decryption algorithm is essentially the same as that of Fuzzy IBE.
• Revocation R(ω, t, rl, st): For all nodes v associated with identity ω, add (v, t) to rl.
Return rl.
Consistency. If identity ω was not revoked before, or at time t, then we will show that
D(dkω,t, c) = m, where dkω,t,m and c are computed as per the consistency requirement in
Section 5.1.1.
From the definition of KUNodes we see that if ω was not revoked before or, at t
then the set of nodes output by KUNodes has one ancestor (or, the node itself) of the
leaf node associated with ω, which implies that there will be a common node in skω, and
kut and hence DK will not output ⊥. Now from the above construction we have that
for a, ax, z, rω, rt ∈ Zp: g, g2, h1, h2, h3 ∈ G ; g1 = ga ; dkω,t = (D, E, d, e) , where D =
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gaxω+a2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(ω)
rω , E = gaxt+a2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(t)
rt , d = grω , e = grt ; c = (ω, t, cω, ct, c1, c2) ,
where cω = Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(ω)
z , ct = Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(t)













= m · e(g1, g2)z ·
(
e(grω ,Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(ω)z)






e(gaxt+a2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3(t)rt , gz)
) ω
ω−t






















= m · e(g1, g2)z
1
e(ga2, gz)




Remarks. The function KUNodes needs to be executed only when rl has changed, so key
authority can store the output of KUNodes, and use it until rl changes. If the number of
users exceeds n, the capacity of the current tree, it is possible to extend the tree and permit
n more users as follows. Take an “empty” tree of the same size and connect the roots of
the current and new trees to the new parent root node. Now the combined tree has 2n leaf
nodes, and new users can be accommodated. Each user will need an additional private
key component computed on the polynomial of the new root node. This new private key
component can be encrypted (under the corresponding identity and time), and published.
Efficiency. We first analyze communication and time complexity of key authority in com-
puting and publishing key updates as a function of the number of users n and number of
revoked users r. We compare the worst case complexity of our scheme with that of the
general revocation solution suggested by Boneh-Franklin [34] that we outlined in the In-
troduction. Table 1 summarizes the results. The complexity analysis for our construction
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follows directly from Theorem 1 of [2], as the number of necessary key updates in our
scheme corresponds to the number of nodes returned by function KUNodes, and a similar
function on the binary tree was used in [2].
As the table shows, our scheme represents a significant improvement over the Boneh-
Franklin solution for small values of r. For larger values of r (especially as it reaches close
to n), this advantage is lost. We however note that as r becomes large, our scheme can be
“reset” to keep key update efficient (by running the setup algorithm again which will make
the revocation list empty and releasing new private keys for only non-revoked users).
In terms of encryption and decryption, our construction is slightly less efficient than the
existing IBE schemes. E.g., the decryption algorithms of IBEs by Waters [88] and Boneh-
Boyen [31] require 2 pairing computations (the slowest computation compared to group
operations and exponentiations), and our scheme requires 4. Encryption in the schemes of
[88, 31] is dominated by 3 and 4 exponentiations, while our scheme uses 12. We chose
Waters and Boneh-Boyen constructions for comparison, because they are the most efficient
IBE schemes secure in standard (RO devoid) model under standard assumptions. This may
be a reasonable price to pay for the significant improvement in key-update efficiency, which
may become a bottleneck for a large number of users. We note that the size of secret keys
is larger in our scheme, a user needs to store up to 3h = 3 log n group elements.
We note that using the suggestion from [80], efficiency of our scheme, and in particular,
its encryption algorithm, can be improved, if a hash function is used in place of the function
H. Security analysis in this case will need to rely on the random oracle (RO) model [18].
This will improve the number of exponentiations in encryption to 4, while the decryption
algorithm will still be dominated by 4 paring operations. In contrast, the cost of encryption
and decryption in the Boneh-Franklin scheme [34] is dominated by one pairing each.
Security. Even though different users have their private keys computed on the same polyno-
mial, this does not introduce insecurity in RIBE as opposed to Fuzzy IBE. In our scheme,
collusion among different users is possible, however such collusion is not useful. No matter
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Table 1: Key Update Complexity (# of users n, # of revoked users r)
r = 0 1 < r ≤ n/2 n/2 < r ≤ n
BF [34] O(n) O(n − r) O(n − r)
Revocable IBE O(1) O(r log (nr )) O(n − r)
how many revoked users try to collude, they will still be unable to decrypt a ciphertext for
a new time period, as they cannot obtain the necessary decryption key component. One
might be tempted to reduce the security of RIBE to the security of Fuzzy IBE, since after
all RIBE uses Fuzzy IBE as its base construction. However, we want to point out that
such a straightforward reduction of security in a black box manner does not seem possible.
The main reason for this is that in Fuzzy IBE, each time key generation algorithm is run,
it chooses a random polynomial, and then computes the key using that polynomial. How-
ever, in RIBE it is essential that private key and key update be computed on some fixed
polynomials.
We now state the security result.
Theorem 5.2.2. Let G be a prime order bilinear group generator, and RIBE[G] = (S,SK ,
KU,DK ,E,D,R) be the associated Revocable IBE scheme, defined by Construction
5.2.1. Then for any adversary A attacking sRID-CPA security of RIBE with n users,
whose running time is tA, and who asks qp private key generation queries, qk key update
generation queries and qr revocation queries, there exists an adversary B solving DBDH
problem for G, such that
Advsrid−cpa
RIBE,n (A) ≤ 4 · Adv
dbdh
G (B) , (12)
where the running time of B, tB = tA + O(κ3).
Proof of Theorem 5.2.2. We construct an adversary B for the DBDH problem associated
with G. B gets (1κ, G̃, p, g, X, Y,Z,W) as input and it has to return a bit d. It is going to use
A.
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g1 ← X, g2 ← Y
Pick random second-degree polynomials f (x), u(x) with coefficients in Zp,
s.t. u(x) = −x2 for x = ω∗, t∗, o.w. u(x) , −x2




pk ← (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3)
Let rl be an empty set, and T be a binary tree with at least n leaf nodes.
Pick a leaf node v∗ from T, and a random bit rev








c∗1 ← mb ·W, c
∗
2 ← Z, c
∗
ω ← Z
f (ω∗), c∗t ← Z
f (t∗)









← ASK(·),KU(·),R(·,·)(1κ, pk, c∗, state′)
if any of the oracles abort, return 1
else if b = d return 1 else, return 0
Now, we present the subroutines for answering the oracle queries. These subroutines use
the functions that we define here. For i, j, l, r′ ∈ Zp, S = {0, j} define
F1(i, j, l, r′)
def


























if rev = 0 and ω = ω∗, then abort
if rev = 1 and ω = ω∗, then:
v← v∗,
∀x ∈ Path(v) rx
$
← Zp
if @lx, then lx
$




∗)rx , dx ← grx
if rev = 0 and ω , ω∗, then:
pick an unassigned leaf node v from T, and store ω in node v
∀x ∈ Path(v) r′x
$
← Zp,
if @lx, then lx
$
← Zp, and store lx in node x
i← ω, j← t∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Dx ← F1(i, j, l, r′), dx ← F2(i, r′)
if rev = 1 and ω , ω∗, then:
pick an unassigned leaf node v from T, and store ω in node v
∀x ∈ Path(v) r′x
$
← Zp,
if @lx, then lx
$
← Zp, and store lx in node x
i← ω, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
∀x ∈ (Path(v) \ Path(v∗))
j← t∗
Dx ← F1(i, j, l, r′), dx ← F2(i, r′)
∀x ∈ (Path(v) ∩ Path(v∗))
j← ω∗
Dx ← F1(i, j, l, r′), dx ← F2(i, r′)
return skω = {(x,Dx, dx)}x ∈ Path(v)
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R(ω, t) :
for all leaf nodes v associated with identity ω, add (v, t) to rl
KU(t) :
if rev = 1 and t = t∗ and ∀t ≤ t∗ we have that (ω∗, t) < rl, then abort
else if t = t∗, then:






∗)rx , ex ← grx
if rev = 1 and t , t∗, then:
∀x ∈ (KUNodes(T, rl, t) \ Path(v∗))
r′x
$
← Zp, i← t, j← t∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Ex ← F1(i, j, l, r′), ex ← F2(i, r′)
∀x ∈ (KUNodes(T, rl, t) ∩ Path(v∗))
r′x
$
← Zp, i← t, j← ω∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Ex ← F1(i, j, l, r′), ex ← F2(i, r′)
if rev = 0 and t , t∗, then:
∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t)
r′x
$
← Zp, i← t, j← t∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Ex ← F1(i, j, l, r′), ex ← F2(i, r′)
return kut = {(x, Ex, ex)}x ∈ KUNodes(T,rl,t)
Analysis. f (x) being a random polynomial ensures that h1, h2, h3 are random, so pk has the
right distribution. For i = 1, 2, 3 hi = g
u(i)
2 g




Since x = ω∗, t∗ u(x) = −x2, then Hg2,h1,h2,h3(ω
∗) = g f (ω
∗),Hg2,h1,h2,h3(t
∗) = g f (t
∗). If W =
e(g, g)xyz, then c∗1 = mb · W = mb · e(g1, g2)
z, cω∗ = Z f (ω




∗) = gz f (t
∗) = Hg2,h1,h2,h3(t
∗)z. So, if B is in Expdbdh-realG (B), then c∗ is a well-formed
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ciphertext of mb. Otherwise, if W = e(g, g)w for a random w, then c∗1 = mb ·W = mb ·e(g, g)
w,
so w being random and independent from x, y, z ensures that c∗1 is also random, and thus c
∗
hides bit b information-theoretically. In what follows, let g1 = ga (to simplify notation).
Case 1. rev = 1, ω = ω∗ in SK(ω) oracle simulation:
Define ax = 1ω∗ (lx − a). Then Dx = g
axω∗+a
2 Hg2,h1,h2,h3(ω
∗)rx , dx = grx . So, skω has the right
distribution.
Case 2. rev = 0, ω , ω∗ in SK(ω) oracle simulation:












































































































So, skω has the right distribution.
Case 3. rev = 1 and ω , ω∗. Similar arguments as above apply if we define
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ω2+u(ω) )∆0,S (ω) for nodes on the path of v
∗ and




ω2+u(ω) )∆0,S (ω) for rest of the nodes.
Similar arguments as above apply for all cases in KU(t) oracle simulation if we define:




t2+u(t) )∆0,S (t) for all nodes.




t2+u(t) )∆0,S (t) for nodes on the path of




t2+u(t) )∆0,S (t) for rest of the nodes.
Note that we are defining ax consistently in both oracle simulations, i.e., in case rev = 0,
ax = 1t∗ (lx − a) for all nodes, and in case rev = 1, ax =
1
ω∗
(lx − a) for all nodes on the path
from v∗ to the root node, ax = 1t∗ (lx − a) for rest of the nodes. Also note that values lx
which are stored in node x, and identities ω which are stored in leaf nodes of tree T, have
the right distribution, and also that they are modified only by SK(ω) oracle; KU(t) and
R(ω, t) oracles do not modify them. Similarly, revocation list rl is modified only by R(ω, t)
oracle; SK(ω) and KU(t) oracles do not modify them. Thus, oracles maintain the state
and revocation list consistently and with right distribution.
Claim 5.2.3. Let sreal, srand denote the events that none of the oracles abort in Expdbdh-realG (B),
Expdbdh-randG (B) respectively. Then,




Proof of Claim 5.2.3. We will prove the claim in two parts. First we will show that Pr [ sreal ] =
Pr [ srand ] and then we will show that Pr [ sreal ] ≥ 12 .
First part is easy to see. The probability that SK(ω) and KU(t) oracles abort de-
pends on the bit rev which is chosen independently from whether B is in Expdbdh-realG,B (1κ) or
Expdbdh-randG,B (1κ). So, Pr [ sreal ] = Pr [ srand ]. Now it remains to show that Pr [ sreal ] ≥
1
2 .
Condition 3 of Definition 5.1.2 says that SK(ω) oracle can be queried on ω∗ only if
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R(ω, t) oracle was queried on (ω∗, t) for any t ≤ t∗. Thus, we have
Pr [ ω = ω∗ ] ≤ Pr [ (ω∗, t) ∈ rl, ∀ t ≤ t∗ ]
⇒ 1 − Pr [ ω = ω∗ ] ≥ Pr [ (ω∗, t) < rl, ∀ t ≤ t∗ ]
⇒ 1 − Pr [ ω = ω∗ ] ≥ Pr [ (t = t∗) ∧ ((ω∗, t) < rl, ∀ t ≤ t∗) ] .
We see that SK(ω) oracle aborts, if rev = 0, and ω = ω∗ and KU(t) oracle aborts if





= Pr [ (rev = 0) ∧ (ω = ω∗) ]
+ Pr [ (rev = 1) ∧ (t = t∗) ∧ ((ω∗, t) < rl, ∀ t ≤ t∗) ]
= Pr [ rev = 0 ] · Pr [ ω = ω∗ ]




Pr [ ω = ω∗ ] +
1
2





Therefore, Pr [ sreal ] ≥ 12 . 
We have shown above that when B is in Expdbdh-realG (B), and none of the oracles abort,
then B is simulating the exact experiment Expsrid−cpa
RIBE,n (A) for A. So,
Pr
[





RIBE,n (A) = 1
]
.
When B is in Expdbdh-randG (B), and none of the oracles abort then as explained earlier bit
b is information-theoretically hidden from A. So,
Pr
[






Also, since B outputs 1, if either of the oracles aborts, so
Pr
[










AdvdbdhG (B) = Pr
[




Expdbdh-randG (B) = 1
]
= Pr [ sreal ] · Pr
[








Expdbdh-realG (B) = 1|sreal
]
−Pr [ srand ] · Pr
[










































Finally, we observe that tB = tA + O(κ3) as B does only a constant number of modulo
exponentiations and multiplications and picks a constant number of random group elements
(recall that by convention tA includes the time of the experiment including computations
done by the oracles. 
5.3 Addressing CCA Security
We suggest two ways to construct RIBE schemes that resist chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our
first solution is a modification of our main construction. Our second solution is generic, in
that it is based on any sRID-CPA secure scheme, though CCA security relies on the RO
model.
RIBECCA Construction. We combine the ideas of [32] (used there for a different problem of
constructing an IND-CCA public-key encryption scheme) with the error-tolerance property
of Fuzzy IBE to modify our Revocable IBE scheme. Changes are mainly in the encryption
and decryption algorithms. We employ a strongly-unforgeable one-time signature scheme
(cf. [32] that recalls the primitive, and its security definition). The setup algorithm of
the new scheme is very similar to the one in Fuzzy IBE, where 2 out of 3 attributes of
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ciphertexts should match with those of the decryption key. The private key generation
and key update generation algorithms are very similar to those of RIBE, except that we
now use second-degree polynomials as opposed to first-degree polynomials in RIBE. The
encryption algorithm runs the key generation algorithm of one-time signature to obtain a
signing key and a verification key, and then encrypts the message with three attributes:
identity, time and verification key. Then it signs the resulting intermediate ciphertext using
the signing key. The decryption algorithm verifies the signature, and that the ciphertext is
properly formed (by using a ciphertext sanity check due to [52]) before decrypting.
LetG be a bilinear group generator andOTS = (SGen,T ,Ver) be a strongly-unforgeable
one-time signature scheme. Let RIBE[G] = (S,SK ,KU,DK ,E,D,R) be the scheme
of Construction 5.2.1. We define RIBECCA[G,OTS] = (S′,SK ′,KU′,DK ,E′,D′,R)
by specifying the differences from RIBE. Here we require that identities, time periods,
and the verification keys for the one-time signature output by SGen are mapped to dis-
tinguished elements in Z∗p (e.g., by pre-pending “00”, “01” and “11” to strings of these
types, and then using a collision-resistant hash function that maps {0, 1}∗ to Z∗p. Let J be
{1, 2, 3, 4}.
• Setup S′(κ, n): Everything is the same as in S, except that pk has an additional
element h4
$
← G, and thus pk = (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3, h4).
• Private Key Generation SK ′(pk,mk, ω, st): Everything is the same as in SK , ex-
cept that now we pick a random second-degree polynomial qx(y) with coefficients in
Zp, and the same restriction that qx(0) = a. Parse pk as (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3, h4), mk as
a, st as T. Pick an unassigned leaf node v from T, and store ω in that node.
∀x ∈ Path(v)
if qx is undefined, then pick a random second-degree polynomial qx,
s.t. qx(0) = a, and store qx in node x
rx
$
← Zp ; Dx ← g
qx(ω)
2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(ω)
rx ; dx ← grx
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Return skω = {(x,Dx, dx)}x ∈ Path(v) ; st.
• Key Update Generation KU′(pk,mk, t, rl, st): Parse pk as (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3, h4),
mk as a, st as T.
∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t)
rx
$
← Zp ; Ex ← g
qx(t)
2 Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(t)
rx ; ex ← grx
Return kut = {(x, Ex, ex)}x ∈ KUNodes(T,rl,t).





Zp; c1 ← m·e(g1, g2)z; c2 ← gz; cω ← Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(ω)z; ct ← Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(t)z; cvk ←
Hg2,h1,h2,h3,h4(vk)
z ; c← (ω, t, cω, ct, cvk, c1, c2) ; σ← T (sigk, c). Return c̃ = (c, σ, vk).
• DecryptionD′(dkω,t, c̃): Parse dkω,t as (D, E, d, e), c̃ as (c = (ω, t, cω, ct, cvk, c1, c2), σ, vk).
If Ver(vk, c, σ) , 1, then return ⊥.
Else pick r1, r2, r3
$
← Zp
If e(c2,Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(ω)r1 · Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(t)r2 × Hg2,J,h1,h2,h3,h4(vk)r3) ,
e(g, cr1ωcr2t c
r3













One can verify that consistency follows directly from consistency of OTS and RIBE.
RIBECCA Security. We claim the following.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let G be a prime order bilinear group generator, OTS = (SGen,T ,Ver)
be a one-time signature scheme andRIBECCA[G,OTS] = (S′,SK ′,KU′,DK ,E′,D′,R)
be the associated Revocable IBE scheme as per construction above. Then for any adversary
A attacking sRID-CCA security of RIBE with n users, whose running time is tA and who
asks qp private key generation queries, qk key update generation queries, qr revocation
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queries and qd decryption queries, there exist an adversary B solving DBDH problem for
G, and an adversary F attacking strong unforgeability of OTS such that
Advsrid−cca
RIBE,n(A) ≤ 4 · Adv
dbdh




where the last term refers to the advantage of F breaking strong unforgeability of OTS (cf.
[32] for the definition) and tB ≈ tF ≈ tA + qd(
2tp
log n ) + O(k
3).
We provide some intuition before giving the actual proof. It is not hard to show
that RIBECCA is sRID-CPA secure, the security proof is very similar to the proof of
Theorem 5.2.2. Even though a ciphertext is encrypted under an additional attribute: the
verification key, the key authority never issues the corresponding decryption key compo-
nent. To show that RIBECCA is also sRID-CCA secure, the simulator (the DBDH adver-
sary) needs to simulate the decryption oracle. Using the arguments very similar to those
used in [52], we can show that the randomized check in the decryption algorithm that the
simulator can perform as well, does guarantee with overwhelming probability that a ci-
phertext was formed correctly (according to the encryption algorithm). If the adversary
queries a ciphertext whose verification key component is the same as that of the challenge
ciphertext, then the decryption query cannot be answered correctly, but in this case one can
construct an adversary breaking security of the one-time signature scheme. If the verifica-
tion keys are different and the ciphertext passes the randomized check, then the simulator
can generate the decryption key corresponding to the identity and the verification key of
the queried ciphertext, and such a decryption key will successfully decrypt the ciphertext,
because we know from the randomized check that the queried ciphertext is a well-formed
ciphertext. Generating such a decryption key is possible, because the verification key is
different from the challenge verification key, and following the proof of security of Fuzzy
IBE, it is possible for the simulator to generate valid keys for a set of attributes, if they
overlap with the challenge set of attributes in fewer than the threshold number of attributes.
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Proof of Theorem 5.3.1. We construct an adversary B for the DBDH problem associated
with G. B gets (1κ, G̃, p, g, X, Y,Z,W) as input, and it has to return a bit d. It is going to use
A.




g1 ← X, g2 ← Y
sigk∗, vk∗
$
← SGen(1κ), uk∗ ← 01‖vk∗, luk∗
$
← Zp
Pick random third-degree polynomials f (x), u(x) with coefficients in Zp,
s.t. u(x) = −x3 for x = ω∗, t∗, uk∗, o.w. u(x) , −x3




pk = (g, g1, g2, h1, h2, h3, h4)
Let rl be an empty set and T be a binary tree with at least n leaf nodes
Pick a leaf node v∗ from T and a random bit rev.










f (ω∗), c∗t ← Z
f (t∗), c∗uk ← Z
f (uk∗), c∗1 ← mb ·W, c
∗
2 ← Z









σ∗ ← T (sigk∗, c∗).
c̃∗ ← (c∗, σ∗, vk∗).
d
$
← ASK(·),KU(·),R(·,·),D(·)(1κ, pk, c̃∗, state′)
If any of the oracles abort, return 1
Else if b = d, return 1, else return 0
Now we present the subroutines for answering the oracle queries. Subroutines for
SK
′(·),KU′(·),R(·, ·) oracles are very similar to those in the Proof of Theorem 5.2.2, but
we give them here too for the sake of completeness. The oracles use the functions that we
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define here.
For i, j, l, r′ ∈ Zp, uk ← uk∗, luk ← luk∗ , S = {0, j, uk} define
F1(i, j, l, r′)
def

























if rev = 0 and ω = ω∗, then abort
if rev = 1 and ω = ω∗, then
v← v∗,
∀x ∈ Path(v) rx
$
← Zp
if @lx, then lx
$




∗)rx , dx ← grx
if rev = 0 and ω , ω∗, then
pick an unassigned leaf node v from T, and store ω in node v
∀x ∈ Path(v) r′x
$
← Zp
if @lx, then lx
$
← Zp, and store lx in node x
i← ω, j← t∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Dx ← F1(i, j, l, r′), dx ← F2(i, r′)
if rev = 1 and ω , ω∗, then:
pick an unassigned leaf node v from T, and store ω in node v
∀x ∈ Path(v) r′x
$
← Zp
if @lx, then lx
$
← Zp, and store lx in node x
i← ω, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
∀x ∈ (Path(v) \ Path(v∗))
j← t∗
Dx ← F1(i, j, l, r′), dx ← F2(i, r′)
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∀x ∈ (Path(v) ∩ Path(v∗))
j← ω∗
Dx ← F1(i, j, l, r′), dx ← F2(i, r′)
return skω = {(x,Dx, dx)}x ∈ Path(v)
R(ω, t) :
for all leaf nodes v associated with identity ω, add (v, t) to rl
KU
′(t) :
if rev = 1, t = t∗ and ∀t ≤ t∗ (ω∗, t) < rl, then abort
else if t = t∗, then:






∗)rx , ex ← grx
if rev = 1, t , t∗, then
∀x ∈ (KUNodes(T, rl, t) \ Path(v∗))
r′x
$
← Zp, i← t, j← t∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Ex ← F1(i, j, l, r′), ex ← F2(i, r′)
∀x ∈ (KUNodes(T, rl, t) ∩ Path(v∗))
r′x
$
← Zp, i← t, j← ω∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Ex ← F1(i, j, l, r′), ex ← F2(i, r′)
if rev = 0, t , t∗, then
∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t)
r′x
$
← Zp, i← t, j← t∗, l← lx, r′ ← r′x
Ex ← F1(i, j, l, r′), ex ← F2(i, r′)
return kut = {(x, Ex, ex)}x ∈ KUNodes(T,rl,t)
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D′(c̃) :
parse c̃ as (c = (ω, t, cω, ct, cuk, c1, c2), σ, vk)
we assume that ω = ω∗, t = t∗, o.w. such a decryption query can be trivially
replied by generating a decryption key using SK(ω) and KU(t) oracles
if Ver(vk, c, σ) , 1 (i.e. invalid ciphertext), then abort
if Ver(vk, c, σ) = 1 and vk = vk∗, then return a random bit
if Ver(vk, c, σ) = 1 and vk , vk∗, then
first do a ciphertext sanity check on c (as explained in Section 5.3)
if c passes sanity check, then generate dkω,uk = (D, E, d, e) as follows
uk ← 01‖vk, rω, lω, lt, r′uk
$
← Zp, S ← {0, ω, t}
D← glω2 Hg2,h1,h2,h3,h4(ω)






































Analysis. Justification mostly follows directly from the Proof of Theorem 5.2.2, except
for the justification for the simulation of the decryption oracle that we present here. Note
that in RIBECCA, only 2 out of 3 attributes need to be matched between a ciphertext and
decryption key for successful decryption, as opposed to 2 out of 2 attributes in RIBE.
Therefore, in the decryption algorithm, the ciphertext component corresponding to the
verification-key attribute is used only for the ciphertext sanity check and not for actual
decryption. However, the decryption oracle needs to use this ciphertext component for
decrypting ciphertexts encrypted for the challenge identity and the challenge time. The
decryption oracle will therefore fail to decrypt malformed ciphertexts, in particular those
ciphertexts whose verification key components are invalid. So, the ciphertext sanity check
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which discards all such ciphertexts with a very high probability, ensures that the decryp-
tion oracle will be able to answer all but a negligible fraction of valid decryption queries.
Let q(y) be a second-degree polynomial. Let g1 = ga (to simplify notation). Define
q(0) = a, q(ω) = lω, q(t) = lt, ruk = (r′uk −
a
uk3+u(uk) )∆0,S (uk), then as in Section 6.3 of [83],
we can show that D = gq(ω)2 Hg2,h1,h2,h3,h4ω)
rω , d = grω , E = gq(uk)2 Hg2,h1,h2,h3,h4(uk)
ruk , e = gruk .
From the consistency condition of RIBECCA, it follows that decryption of c using dkω,uk
will yield the right message. Hence, B correctly simulates the decryption oracle, ex-
cept for the event when A queries a ciphertext (c, σ, vk∗) to the decryption oracle, where
(c, σ) , (c∗, σ∗) and Ver(vk∗, c, σ) = 1. We denote this event by forge. Note that the defi-
nition of forge is essentially the same as in the Proof of Theorem 1 of [32], but we write it
here too for the sake of completeness. Event forge also includes the case where A queries
(c, σ, vk∗) before receiving the challenge ciphetext, in which case (c, σ) may or may not be
equal to (c∗, σ∗). Now, it is easy to see that (c, σ, vk∗) can be used to forge a signature of












Thus, from Theorem 5.2.2 and decryption oracle oracle simulation we have
Advsrid−cca
RIBECCA,n(A) ≤ 4 · Adv
dbdh








The above implies the statement of the theorem. 
We note that alternatively we could utilize simulation-sound NIZK proofs in a way
similar to the construction of CCA secure Fuzzy IBE in [83], but our construction is more
efficient.
Generic CCA construction. The Fujisaki-Okamoto (or, FO for short) transform [44, 43]
is a generic transform to convert a CPA secure public-key encryption scheme into a CCA
secure one, in the RO model. The transform can also be applied to IBE schemes as shown in
[64]. Here we show how to apply the FO transform to Revocable IBE schemes. Unlike the
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previous approach, this solution is generic in that it applies to any Revocable IBE scheme.
If applied to our construction, then we suggest to use its more efficient RO modification we
discussed, since the FO transform also relies on the RO model.
Let RIBE = (S,SK ,KU,DK ,E,D,R) be any Revocable IBE scheme as per Defi-
nition 5.1.1. We can construct another Revocable IBE scheme FO-RIBECCA = (S′,SK ,
KU,DK ,E′,D′,R) as follows (we only specify the differences fromRIBE). Let (MsgSp,
IdSp,TimeSp) and (MsgSp′, IdSp,TimeSp) be the (message space, identity space, time
space) of RIBE and FO-RIBECCA, respectively. Let COINS be the set from where
E draws its random coins. We require that for every m ∈ MsgSp′, σ ∈ {0, 1}κ, we have
that m ‖ σ ∈ MsgSp. To make the use of randomness explicit, we use the notation
r
$
← COINS;E(·, ·, ·, ·; r) as opposed to the traditional shorthand E(·, ·, ·, ·). The setup algo-
rithm S′(1κ, n) follows S. In addition, it specifies a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → COINS
and outputs it as part of the public parameters pk′. The encryption and decryption algo-
rithms are as follows.
• Encryption E′(pk′, ω, t,m): σ
$
← {0, 1}κ; r ← H(m‖σ‖ω‖t); c← E(pk, ω, t,m‖σ; r).
Return c.
• DecryptionD′(dkω,t, c): m′ ← D(dkω,t, c). Parse m′ as m‖σ ; r ← H(m‖σ ‖ ω ‖ t).
If c = E(pk, ω, t,m‖σ ; r), then return m, else return ⊥.
Consistency follows from the justification of the consistency requirement for RIBE.
Before we present the security analysis of FO-RIBECCA, we define a property that we
call γ-uniformity for Revocable IBE schemes.
γ-uniformity. The γ-uniformity property has been defined earlier in the context of public
key encryption schemes [44] and identity-based encryption schemes [90]. Here we define
it for Revocable IBE schemes.
Definition 5.3.2. [γ-uniformity] Let RIBE = (S,SK ,KU,DK ,E,D,R) be a Revocable
IBE scheme. For any public parameter pk output by S, any given identity ω ∈ IdSp, time
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t ∈ TimeSp, the corresponding decryption key dk, message m ∈ MsgSp and a ciphertext c
output by E define




← COINS : c = E(pk, ω, t,m; r)
]
.
We say that RIBE is γ-uniform if for any ω ∈ IdSp, t ∈ TimeSp,m ∈ MsgSp and any
ciphertext c output by E, γ(m, c) ≤ γ.
FO-RIBECCA Security.
Theorem 5.3.3. Let RIBE be a γ-uniform Revocable IBE scheme with message space
MsgSp, identity space IdSp, time space TimeSp and set of coinsCOINS for its encryption
algorithm. LetH be a hash function mapping MsgSp× IdSp× TimeSp to COINS (mod-
eled as the RO) and FO-RIBECCA be the associated Revocable IBE scheme as per con-
struction above. Then for an adversary A attacking sRID-CCA security of FO-RIBECCA
with n users, whose running time is tA and who asks qd decryption queries and qh random





















where the running time of B, tB ≈ tA + κqh .
Proof of Theorem 5.3.3. We construct an adversary B attacking the sRID-CPA security of
RIBE. B is going to use the adversary A attacking sRID-CCA security of FO-RIBECCA
(in RO model). It has access to SK(·),KU(·), and R(·, ·) oracles. It needs to simulate





return (ω∗, t∗, state) and get back pk
run A and answer its queries to the SK(·),KU(·) and R(·, ·) oracles by using













′(·),RO(·)(1κ, pk, c∗, state′)
if any of the oracles or A aborts, then for i ∈ {0, 1} find a tuple (mi‖σi, ω, t, r)
in the list stored by RO. If such a tuple is found, return i, else return 1
else if neither the oracles nor A aborts, return d
Below we present the subroutines for answering RO(·) andD′(·) oracle queries.
RO(m ‖ ω ‖ t) :
if (m, ω, t) was queried before, then return the corresponding r
else r
$
← COINS, store (m, ω, t, r), and return r
D′(c) :
compute ω, t from c
find a tuple (m, ω, t, r) stored by RO(·) oracle, such that c = E(pk, ω, t,m ; r)
if no such pair found, then abort
else parse m as m′‖σ, where m′ ∈ MsgSp′ and σ ∈ {0, 1}κ
return m′
Analysis. Let the challenge bit for the adversary B be b. Define the following events.
abort: Decryption oracle aborts in the sRID-CCA experiment simulated by B.
succA: A succeeds in the sRID-CCA experiment simulated by B, given that abort does
not occur.
succB: B succeeds in the sRID-CPA experiment, given that abort does not occur.
queryb: A queries (mb‖σb, ω, t, r) to the random oracle in the sRID-CCA experiment
simulated by B.
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queryb′: A queries (mb̄‖σb̄, ω, t, r) to the random oracle in the sRID-CCA experiment
simulated by B.



























































































But we know that the probability that A queries a (mb̄‖σb̄, ω, t, r) tuple to the random
oracle is at most 2−κ, because σb̄ is a randomly chosen κ-bit value that is information









Also, Pr [ succA ] = Advsrid−cca
FO-RIBECCA,n(A) + 1/2. So,









It remains to estimate Pr [ ¬abort ]. The event abort occurs when A queries the decryption
oracle for some ciphertext without querying the random oracle for the randomness that was
used to generate the ciphertext. From the definition of γ-uniformity (Definition 5.3.2), we
know that this can happen with probability at most γ. Thus,
Pr [ ¬abort ] ≤ (1 − γ)qd ≈ (1 − γqd) .
Therefore,
Advsrid−cpa

































The above implies the statement of the theorem. 
5.4 Revocable ABE and Fuzzy IBE
Key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) [53] is a generalization of Fuzzy IBE,
which allows the key authority to specify more advanced decryption policies. In KP-ABE,
as in Fuzzy IBE, each ciphertext is labeled by the sender with a set of descriptive attributes.
However, each private key is associated with an access tree that specifies which type of
ciphertexts the key can decrypt. A key can decrypt a particular ciphertext, only if the ci-
phertext attributes satisfy the access tree of the key. The problem of revocation of attributes
is as relevant to KP-ABE as the problem of identity revocation is relevant for IBE. There
is no solution known other than the frequent key update for all attributes. As we explained
earlier, this solution does not scale well. We extend our ideas to construct a key-policy
attribute-based encryption with efficient revocation, or simply, Revocable KP-ABE. We
will only explain how to obtain a Revocable KP-ABE, and that will imply a Revocable
Fuzzy IBE as well. The security of our construction holds only in a weaker selective revo-
cation list model, where the adversary must declare in advance all the users to be revoked
prior to the challenge time.
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The construction uses the KP-ABE construction from [53] and a binary tree in the
following way. Messages are encrypted with attributes β and time, where β is the set of
attributes which is used in encryption in KP-ABE. The root node of the access tree of de-
cryption key is a 2-out-of-2 gate whose one child is time (similarly to Revocable IBE) and
the other child is the root node of the access tree. The component of decryption key corre-
sponding to the access tree and the time are called private key and key update, respectively.
Private key for an access tree is computed in the same way as keys are computed in KP-
ABE, except that instead of the root polynomial of the access tree, the root polynomial of
decryption key evaluates to the master key at 0. The use of binary tree is essentially the
same in both Revocable IBE and Revocable KP-ABE, e.g., the way users are assigned to
leaf nodes, the way polynomials are selected for each node, the number of private keys




Even though this thesis was mainly motivated by provable security in practice, only the
first result has a direct impact on a practical and widely deployed protocol Kerberos, in
that this is the first work on provable security analysis of the two types of authenticated
encryption schemes used in Kerberos version 5, called General Profile and Simplified Pro-
file. Our results show that the authenticated encryption paradigm used in General Profile
does not provide integrity, even if it uses secure building blocks (e.g., a collision-resistant
hash function and an IND-CPA encryption scheme). While our attacks do not apply for
particular instantiations of General Profile suggested in the specifications, they do show
limitation of the design. We suggest simple and easy to implement modifications, and we
show that the resulting scheme provably provides privacy and authenticity, under standard
assumptions. We prove that Modified General Profile and Simplified Profile are IND-CCA
and INT-CTXT secure, if they utilize secure building blocks. This justifies the assumption
about the security of encryption necessary for the recent formal-methods-based symbolic
analyses. Together, these results provide strong security guarantees for Kerberos that we
believe will help its standardization.
Our second result concerns the generation of different strings, e.g., confounder, session
keys, sequence numbers, etc., which are all suggested to be generated at random in the
Kerberos specifications. Our proposed hash-function-based PRG can be used to generate
these strings with provable security guarantees. The security of our PRG relies on the
assumptions that the underlying hash function is regular and collision-resistant, where the
regularity assumption can be relaxed to a new notion of worst-case regularity introduced
in our work, and the collision-resistance is required to be exponential. We note that even
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though our PRG is the most efficient function-based PRG known that relies on reasonable
assumptions, it is still relatively less efficient than practical and standardized PRGs, and
as such we don’t envision it being directly used in practical protocols. We believe that the
small loss in efficiency is justified, given that our assumptions are much more standard and
reasonable compared to the ones used for standardized PRGs.
Finally, in our third and last result, we present new primitives, and their efficient and
provably secure constructions targeted at the problem of revocation in IBEs and ABEs.
Due to the attractive features offered by these new types of encryption schemes, they have
been used in many practical protocols, and are most likely to be used in future as well. We
note that our results and techniques for revocation have found much wider applications in
information security, such as mobile social networks, cloud-based secure health records,
data outsourcing systems, vehicular ad-hoc networks, etc.
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